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Rational choice theory is the dominant paradigm through which scholars of 
international law and international relations approach treaty design. In this 
Article, I suggest a different approach using a combination of empirical 
observations of state behavior and theoretical insights from behavioral economics. 
I focus on one aspect of multilateral treaty design: namely, treaty reservations 
and associated legal mechanisms which allow states to vary the degree of their 
formal commitments to treaties. I call these mechanisms “treaty options.”. I 
argue that the framing of treaty options matters powerfully — and does so in 
ways inconsistent with rational choice theory, but consistent with insights from 
behavioral economics. This finding has important implications for the theory, 
law, and practice of treaty-making and for our understandings of state behavior 
more generally. 
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INTRODUCTION 
What causes states to consent to international legal obligations? 
Particularly in treaty-based law, this is a question of fundamental 
importance since states are only bound by treaties to which they have 
expressly consented. Yet it is also a question that international legal 
scholars rarely address. In contrast to the multiplicity of theories about 
why states do (or do not) obey existing international legal obligations, 
scholarship on why states create such obligations in the first place tends to 
rest on one largely unexamined assumption.  
This assumption is that states consent to international legal obligations 
based upon rational decisions aimed at advancing their own interests. It 
implicitly underlies Louis Henkin’s analysis of international law-making in 
How Nations Behave,1 and explicitly guides substantial recent work by 
scholars in both international law and international relations.2 As 
                                                          
1. See LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 36 (1979) (“A government’s policy as to whether 
some activity of international interest should remain unregulated, or what form regulation should 
take, is a political decision like others made by policy-makers in light of the national interest as they 
see it.”). 
2. For some prominent examples, see JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 83–91 (2005); ANDREW GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS 
25–29 (2008); THE RATIONAL DESIGN OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 1–39 (Barbara 
Koremenos et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter RATIONAL DESIGN]; ROBERT SCOTT & PAUL STEPHAN, 
THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN: CONTRACT THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 9, 59–60 (2006); see also, e.g., sources cited infra notes 112–114. Even scholars taking a 
constructivist approach may rely on this instrumental assumption. E.g., Alex Geisinger & Michael 
Ashley Stein, A Theory of Expressive International Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 77, 110 (2007). 
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assumptions go, it is intuitively attractive, methodologically useful, and 
deeply reassuring. The idea that states act rationally to advance their 
interests seems entirely sensible and generates a model — rational choice 
theory — with clear parameters. This model leaves ample room for debate 
as to what constitutes state interests or their rational pursuit, but is also 
comfortingly bounded: under a rational choice approach, one need not 
concern oneself with questions like whether key negotiations took place 
before or after lunch, or which of two legally equivalent framings is used 
to set forth a commitment. While even strict proponents of rational choice 
theory will acknowledge that states sometimes act irrationally, they deny 
that these deviations can be predicted and theorized. 
Such ready reliance on rational choice theory as a model for 
understanding state consent comes at a time when this theory has 
increasingly come into question as a model for understanding individual 
decision-making. Research in cognitive psychology and behavioral 
economics has shown that individuals frequently deviate in predictable 
ways from rationally optimal behavior — even to the point of making very 
different decisions before or after lunch.3 One finding is that individuals 
are far more subject to framing effects than a rational choice model would 
predict; that is, to basing decisions partly or fully on the way in which 
choices are presented rather than on their substantive content. Consider, 
for example, people’s willingness to be organ donors. Austria, Belgium, 
Sweden, and France presume people to be organ donors unless they 
explicitly opt out, and in these countries 85% or more consent to be 
donors.4 By contrast, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the 
United Kingdom presume people not to be organ donors unless they 
affirmatively opt in, and in these countries 28% or fewer consent to be 
donors.5 This bias in favor of the status quo, in company with other 
framing effects, is borne out by numerous studies of individual decision-
making.6 But so far, this research has had relatively little impact on 
international legal scholarship7 and almost none on the question of why 
                                                          
3. Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 P.N.A.S. 6889 (2011) (finding 
that judges granted a significantly higher percentage of parole requests in cases that they heard 
immediately after food breaks). 
4. Eric J. Johnson & Daniel G. Goldstein, Defaults and Donation Decisions, 78 TRANSPLANTATION 
1713, 1715 (2004). Randomized experiments where respondents “could at a mouse click change their 
choice, largely eliminating effort explanations” also revealed a sharp framing effect. Id. at 1714–15 
(finding that 82% of subjects agreed to be organ donors under an opt-out condition while only 42% 
agreed under an opt-in condition). 
5. Id.  
6. For a discussion of some of this extensive literature, see infra Part III.B.1. 
7. This is beginning to change, particularly in the context of human rights law. See SOCIAL 
SCIENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Ryan Goodman et al., eds., forthcoming 2012) (exploring insights 
that social science research can bring to human rights law) (introduction available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1910684); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, 
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states consent to international obligations. Scholars like Jack Goldsmith 
and Eric Posner nod to this research but dismiss it, observing that 
“individual cognitive errors might have few if any macro effects on 
international relations.”8 
In this Article, I challenge the rational choice approach to state consent 
and argue that state decision-making can instead reflect predictable 
cognitive biases similar to those found in individual decision-making. I do 
this by looking empirically at certain forms of state consent and arguing 
that the results are better accounted for by insights from behavioral 
economics than by rational choice theory. In particular, I show that, 
counterintuitive as it may be, states appear subject to framing effects 
similar to those discussed above in the organ donation example. I argue 
that these effects could result either from direct cognitive biases on the 
part of state agents, or from these agents’ expectations that their 
constituencies are subject to cognitive biases. My conclusions in turn have 
powerful implications for the design of international agreements. In 
particular, I argue that rather than assuming rational action on the part of 
states, negotiators designing treaty regimes should draw explicitly on 
principles from behavioral economics, especially the sub-field that Richard 
Thaler and Cass Sunstein have termed “choice architecture.”9 
More specifically, this Article focuses on an area of international law 
notorious for its “unusual — in fact baffling — complexity.”10 This is the 
law of treaty reservations and associated mechanisms built into multilateral 
treaties that permit states to vary their formal commitments to treaties. 
These mechanisms, which collectively I will call “treaty options,” 
effectively make certain parts of treaties optional for state parties. The 
most well-known of these mechanisms is the law of treaty reservations, 
which in essence allows individual states to join treaties subject to 
                                                                                                                                      
How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L. J. 621 (2004) 
(drawing on research on peer effects and social norms in proposing their acculturalization theory of 
state behavior); Andrew K. Woods, A Behavioral Approach to Human Rights, 51 HARV. J. INT’L L. 51 
(2010) (suggesting that international human rights law should harness insights from behavioral 
economics); cf. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, A Behavioral Approach to International Cooperation (Lab. 
on Int’l Law and Regulation, Working Paper No. 13, July 2012) available at 
http://ilar.ucsd.edu/assets/001/503027.pdf (arguing that individual qualities of patience and 
strategic skill can influence international institutional design); Anne Van Aaken, Towards Behavioral 
International Law and Economics, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 47, 58 (suggesting that prospect theory may have 
something to offer to international law).  
8. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 8.  
9. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 3 (2008). My own approach in this 
Article, which brings together empirical evidence and theory, falls broadly within the “empirical turn” 
in international legal scholarship identified in Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in 
International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2012).  
10. Hersch Lauterpacht, Law of Treaties, 1953 UN Y.B. INT’L LAW COMM’N vol. II 90, 124 (1959); 
see also ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 125 (2007) (deeming this statement 
“even truer today”).  
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reservations, or unilateral rejections of portions of the treaties, so long as 
the treaties do not provide otherwise and these reservations are compatible 
with the treaties’ object and purpose. Treaty reservations are a favorite 
subject of study for international law scholars, including some applying a 
rational choice approach.11 Importantly, however, this Article also 
considers other forms of treaty options that are prevalent in practice but 
largely neglected by the scholarship — namely, options that treaty 
negotiators explicitly write into the treaties and associated documents. 
Such options, which I will call “negotiated options,” include opt-in clauses 
and optional protocols, which allow states to opt in to additional 
commitments, and opt-out clauses, which allow states to opt out of 
otherwise-required commitments.  
In understanding treaty options, it is important to keep in mind the 
distinct roles that states play as treaty negotiators and as treaty ratifiers. These 
two stages involve different types of decision-making. At the negotiating 
stage, states reach collective agreement about what treaty options to permit 
in a treaty; while at the ratification stage they make individual decisions 
about whether or not to join the treaty and, if so, whether or not to take 
advantage of available treaty options. These stages also involve somewhat 
different state agents. At the negotiating stage, states are typically 
represented by diplomats with foreign affairs expertise or actors with 
particular expertise in the subject matter of the treaty, while ratification 
typically involves a wider range of state actors, including state legislative 
bodies. The gaps between negotiation and ratification are further 
magnified by the long time lags that can pass between negotiation and 
ratification, as well as by the facts that not all negotiating states necessarily 
ratify a treaty and, conversely, not all ratifying states necessarily take part in 
treaty negotiations. Accordingly, treaty negotiators must engage in some 
prediction as to how treaty ratifiers will respond to treaty options. 
Treaty options provide an opportunity to study framing effects because 
negotiators often use different types of treaty options for quite similar 
substantive provisions across different treaties. By studying how ratifying 
states respond to different treaty options, I can explore whether these 
states appear to behave rationally or instead seem unduly subject to 
framing effects. In this paper, I focus in particular on two types of 
variations (described in the following two paragraphs). In both instances, I 
                                                          
11. For scholars applying a rational choice approach, see GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 
127–28; Edward Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 307 (2006); Francesco Parisi & Vincy Fon, The 
Economics of Treaty Ratification, 5 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 209 (2009); Francesco Parisi & Catherine 
Sevcenko, Treaty Reservations and the Economics of Article 21(2) of the Vienna Convention, 21 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 1 (2003). For citations to some of the enormous doctrinal literature generated by the law of 
treaty reservations, see the sources cited in Catherine Redgwell, Universality or Integrity?: Some Reflections 
on Reservation to General Multilateral Treaties, 64 BRITISH Y.B. INT’L L. 245, 245 n.4 (1993). 
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find evidence which strongly suggests that states are subject to framing 
effects — and that their decisions about whether or not to consent to 
certain obligations are far more influenced by framing than a rational 
choice approach would suggest.  
First, I look at ways in which ratifying states respond to treaty clauses 
that give them the option of agreeing to International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) jurisdiction over disputes arising from the treaty. Such clauses are 
common, but they can be framed in different ways. Some treaties have 
such clauses and implicitly allow states to make reservations to them; other 
treaties have such clauses and explicitly allow states to opt out of them; 
and still other treaties have such clauses but require states explicitly to opt 
in to them. All else being equal, if states are rational actors then differences 
in framing should have little impact on whether or not these states accept 
ICJ jurisdiction. Yet my review of an important dataset of treaties shows a 
dramatic correlation between framing and state consent. On average, 
where states have the implied authority to reserve out of ICJ jurisdiction, 
95% continue to accept it; and where states have the explicit right to opt 
out of ICJ jurisdiction, 80% continue to accept it. But where states can 
explicitly opt in to ICJ jurisdiction, only a mere 5% of state parties do so 
on average. 
Second, I look at the extent to which ratifying states embrace optional 
compliance mechanisms in human rights treaties where these mechanisms 
are presented through opt-in clauses in the main text and where they are 
instead offered through optional protocols. As a legal matter, these 
mechanisms are basically equivalent: both allow states to take on optional 
commitments of a similar nature. In practice, however, ratifying states 
have proved much more willing on average to embrace these 
commitments when they are presented in optional protocols, which are 
separate documents from the main treaty and thus more salient, than when 
these commitments are presented in opt-in clauses. 
My findings thus show a strong correlation between framing and state 
consent. Of course, a correlation does not necessarily imply causation, and 
there is no way to prove causation with the kind of empirical rigor that 
would be available if one could conduct randomized experiments on 
states. There may indeed be selection effects. For example, negotiators 
might choose to use opt-in ICJ jurisdictional clauses for treaties where 
there is less support for ICJ jurisdiction, and opt-out clauses where there is 
more support. But I do not think these selection effects can fully explain 
the results in light of both the magnitude of the effect (a 75% spread in 
average take-up rates between ICJ opt-in and opt-out clauses) and 
qualitative evidence drawn from records of treaty negotiations. I thus 
argue that the best explanation for at least much of the correlations is a 
simple causation story: framing matters. In the case of ICJ jurisdictional 
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clauses, ratifying states exhibit an overwhelming preference in favor of the 
default option, suggesting that they are subject to something akin to the 
status quo bias found in individual decision-making. In the case of 
compliance mechanisms in human rights treaties, ratifying states appear 
more willing to accept these mechanisms where the option to do so is 
presented to them in a more salient way, suggesting that they are subject to 
something akin to another cognitive bias — a salience bias — shown in 
research on individual decision-making.12 These biases could arise from 
cognitive biases on the part of the state agents involved in ratification. 
Alternatively, they could arise from real or perceived cognitive biases on 
the part of these agents’ constituents (as where ratifying actors anticipate 
that their constituents have a status quo bias and thus are reluctant to 
depart from whatever default treaty option is written into the treaty).  
My argument has implications for treaty design that are both alarming 
and promising. On the one hand, it is alarming to think that state decision-
making may reflect cognitive biases. On the other hand, however, if 
negotiators understand these potential biases, then they have promising 
opportunities available to them. They can undertake “nudges”13 by using 
choice architectural principles to frame options in ways that will increase 
the likelihood that state ratifiers will make the choices preferred by the 
treaty negotiators. I close the Article with considering some of these 
possible implications, urging further research in relation to them, and 
arguing that even without such research, policy-makers should keep these 
possible implications in mind.  
*              *              * 
Part I of this Article surveys the law and practice of treaty options 
available to treaty negotiators. I discuss the legal doctrines underlying both 
treaty reservations and negotiated options and quantitatively assess their 
relative uses in a dataset of over 300 multilateral treaties. Turning to the 
behavior of treaty ratifiers, Part II looks empirically at states’ use of treaty 
options in relation to both ICJ dispute resolution clauses and compliance 
mechanisms in human rights treaties. Quantitatively, I show a strong 
relationship between framing and state participation rates; and 
qualitatively, I draw on additional evidence, including treaty negotiating 
histories, to show that this relationship is likely largely a causal one. Part 
III argues that the results in Part II fit poorly with rational choice theory, 
and instead are best explained by reference to choice architecture 
                                                          
12. See infra Part III.  
13. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 9. 
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principles. Finally, Part IV discusses some implications of my findings for 
the theory, law, and practice of treaty making. 
I. TREATY OPTIONS IN TREATY NEGOTIATION 
To the extent that treaty negotiators wish to build an agreement 
containing uniform commitments, they must choose between stronger 
terms that may attract fewer states and weaker terms that may attract more 
states. Treaty options offer a partial solution to this “broader-deeper 
tradeoff” by allowing states to vary their level of consent to multilateral 
treaties.14  
This Part explores the extraordinarily complex doctrine and practice of 
treaty options. I begin by outlining the history and contours of the most 
well-known form of treaty option: the law of treaty reservations. I also 
discuss the ways in which treaty negotiators can contract out of the law of 
treaty reservations by limiting or banning states’ rights to make 
reservations by including “no-reservation clauses” in treaties. I then turn to 
other ways in which treaty negotiators can explicitly give states flexibility in 
terms of the scope of their consent to multilateral treaties — ways which I 
call “negotiated options.” I focus in particular on opt-in and opt-out 
clauses. Finally, I survey the availability of these different mechanisms in a 
set of over 300 multilateral agreements that includes many of the world’s 
most important treaties. I demonstrate that both no-reservation clauses 
and negotiated options are far more commonly used than the scholarly 
literature has recognized to date. Notably, around 46% of treaties in my set 
                                                          
14. Swaine, supra note 11, at 311. Besides treaty options, there are other ways in which negotiators 
can tailor treaties to accommodate a range of commitments across states. These include 
differentiating between states in the text of the treaty, enabling states to temporarily suspend treaty 
obligations through escape clauses, and authorizing states to terminate their commitment to the 
treaty. See, e.g., RICHARD B. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
64–77 (1981) (describing array of structural mechanisms for controlling state commitment to 
multilateral treaties); Laurence Helfer, Flexibility in International Agreements in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: TAKING STOCK (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1930379 (describing various mechanisms); 
Peter Rosendorff & Helen V. Milner, The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and 
Escape in RATIONAL DESIGN, supra note 2 (analyzing role of escape clauses in trade agreements); 
Michael J. Gilligan, Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade-off in International Multilateral Agreements?, 58 INT’L 
ORG. 459 (2004) (arguing that differentiating between state levels of commitment in the text allows 
negotiators to escape the trade-off between strength and participation); see also Kal Raustiala, Form and 
Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581, 610–13 (2005) (discussing how non-
binding pledges can offer states greater flexibility than binding contracts and thus increase the depth 
of agreements); Barbara Koremenos, Loosening the Tie that Binds; A Learning Model of Agreement 
Flexibility, 55 INT’L ORG. 289 (2001) (discussing how limiting the duration of treaties can increase 
state willingness to cooperate in the face of uncertainty). I focus here on treaty reservations and 
negotiated options, but I note implications of my argument for some of these other mechanisms in 
Part IV. 
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since 1951 include some form of no-reservations clause, and 51% of all 
treaties in my set include at least one opt-in or opt-out clause.  
A. Treaty Reservations 
During the twentieth century, international law-makers struggled with 
the question of how much flexibility states should have in consenting to 
treaties. Much of this struggle focused on the law of treaty reservations. A 
treaty reservation is “a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, 
made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding 
to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of 
certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State.”15 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the law of treaties frowned 
upon treaty reservations. The presumption was that a state had to accept a 
treaty “as is” or not join at all, unless it could persuade all other state 
parties to let it make a reservation.16 The rule that all treaty parties must 
accept a reservation ensured common agreement among them all about 
the extent of a treaty’s application and reduced the likelihood that states 
would propose reservations. But this unanimity rule came at a price in 
terms of participation, since any one state could keep a reserving state 
entirely out of a treaty by objecting to its reservation. 
Over the course of the next half-century, various other approaches 
developed. Treaty negotiators could — and sometimes did — contract 
around the unanimity rule by specifying different procedures in the text of 
the treaty.17 In addition, two important international organizations 
developed ongoing practices that differed from the unanimity rule. The 
Pan American Union (the predecessor to the Organization of American 
States) developed an approach that made it easier for states to make their 
own reservations to treaties negotiated under its auspices but that fractured 
the unity of treaty membership. Under this approach, a reserving state 
became a party to a treaty with regard to states that accepted its 
reservations, but not with regard to states that objected to its 
reservations.18 By contrast, the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
                                                          
15. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(d), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States 
and International Organizations or between International Organizations art. 2(1)(d), Mar. 21, 1986, 
25 ILM 543 (extending this definition to cover international organizations). 
16. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 32–35 (May 28) (Guerrero, J., McNair, J., Read, J., & 
Hsu Mo, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Reservations to the Genocide Convention Case] (discussing numerous 
sources on this point). Consent was often tacit — i.e., implied from the lack of a timely objection. 
17. For examples, see id. at 37–39. 
18. Written Statement of the Organization of American States, Reservations to the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, ¶ 7 (Dec. 14 1950), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/12/11767.pdf.  
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took a very different approach. It developed a practice that allowed states 
to vary the degree to which they committed to a treaty, but only if these 
variations were negotiated in the text of the treaty itself. In its function as 
depository for these treaties, the ILO would refuse to accept ratifications 
that were accompanied by any reservations other than those expressly 
permitted by the terms of the treaty.19 Where the Pan American approach 
allowed states to formulate reservations on their own initiative subject to 
the consent of individual states, the ILO required that variations in state 
commitment to a treaty be negotiated collectively at the time of a treaty’s 
drafting. 
Shortly after World War II, a sharp controversy developed over the 
ratification of the Genocide Convention. The Convention contained a 
clause providing for ICJ jurisdiction over disputes arising under this 
Convention.20 In ratifying the Convention, the Soviet Union attached a 
reservation to this clause, and other states objected to its reservation.21 The 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, who served as the depository for 
the Convention,22 then faced the question of whether the Soviet Union’s 
ratification was valid. He asked for advice from the General Assembly, 
which in turn requested an advisory opinion from the ICJ.23 
In 1951, the ICJ radically transformed the law of treaty reservations in 
its Reservations to the Genocide Convention Case.24 The majority urged “a new 
need for flexibility in the operation of multilateral conventions.”25 In its 
view, the unanimity rule was too strict: it unduly favored the unity of treaty 
commitments at the expense of state participation.26 But what to put in its 
place? Both the Pan American Union and the ILO had briefed the court 
on their respective approaches. In essence, the ICJ ignored the ILO’s 
                                                          
19. Written Statement of the International Labour Organization, Reservations to the Convention 
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, ¶¶ 17–24 (Jan. 12 
1951), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/12/11767.pdf ; see also W. Paul Gormley, The 
Modification of Multilateral Conventions by Means of ‘Negotiated Reservations’ and Other ‘Alternatives’: A 
Comparative Study of the ILO and Council of Europe – Part One, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 59, 67 (1970). 
20. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. IX, opened for 
signature Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.  
21. Andres E. Montalvo, Reservations to the American Convention on Human Rights: A New Approach, 
16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 269, 273 (2001). 
22. A treaty depositary maintains the original text of a treaty, serves as a go-between among 
parties with regard to formal notifications regarding the treaty, and performs various related 
functions. See Vienna Convention, supra note 15, at arts. 76–77. 
23. G.A. Res. 478(V), U.N. Doc. A/RES/478(V) (Nov. 16, 1950). 
24. Reservations to the Genocide Convention Case, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28). 
25. Id. at 22. 
26. This trade-off is often described as one between universality and integrity. E.g., Id. at 46 
(Guerrero, J., McNair, J., Read, J., & Hsu Mo, J., dissenting); Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 80th 
sess., May 4–July 19 1966, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1; GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 9 (1966); 
Redgwell, supra note 11 (discussing the conflict); Swaine, supra note 11, at 330 n.135 (collecting 
sources). 
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approach and embraced a modified version of the Pan American 
approach. Like the Pan American Union, the ICJ endorsed a rule that 
allowed reserving states to become treaty parties with states that accepted 
their reservations, but not with states that objected to the reservations.27 
Unlike the Pan American approach, however, the ICJ added the 
requirement that reservations should be “compatible” with the “object and 
purpose” of the treaty at issue.28 
The ICJ’s approach ultimately formed the basis for the law of treaty 
reservations set out in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. The Vienna Convention did not settle all questions relating to 
treaty reservations — indeed, a massive project underway at the 
International Law Commission (ILC) is addressing continuing 
uncertainties29 — but it did resolve many of them. For current purposes, 
four features from the Vienna Convention are noteworthy. First, the 
Vienna Convention establishes default rules rather than absolute ones. It 
recognizes that treaty negotiators can contract around these default rules in 
the text of their treaties.30 Second, for most treaties the default rules are 
those suggested by the ICJ. Where a treaty is silent about reservations, a 
state may attach reservations that are not “incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the treaty,” and the treaty will enter into force between this 
state and states that do not object to the reservations.31 Indeed, the Vienna 
Convention places an even higher premium on participation than did the 
ICJ by providing that the treaty will also enter into force between a 
reserving state and an objecting state, unless the objecting state insists 
otherwise.32 Third, the Vienna Convention embraces a principle of 
reciprocity: a state that reserves out of a particular treaty obligation cannot 
                                                          
27. Reservations to the Genocide Convention Case, 1951 I.C.J. at 25–27 (May 28). 
28. See id. at 24. The ICJ also suggested that states should only object to reservations they found 
incompatible with the treaty’s object and purpose, but hinted at the possibility that a state could 
object to more minor reservations in a way that would not otherwise prevent the treaty from entering 
into force between it and the reserving state. See id. at 27. 
29. This study on Reservations to Treaties, led by Special Rapporteur Alain Pellet, was begun in 
1993. It is now hopefully nearing completion after generating sixteen reports and resulting in a Guide 
to Practice on Reservations to Treaties (Guide to Practice) that the ILC has provisionally adopted. See 
Summaries: Reservations to Treaties, INT’L LAW COMM’N, 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/1_8.htm (last updated Oct. 11, 2011) (containing links to the 
sixteen reports and the Guide to Practice). 
30. See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 15, art. 19 (noting that a treaty can prohibit 
reservations or permit only specified ones); id. art. 20(4) (stating rules that apply “unless the treaty 
otherwise provides”); Id. art. 22 (stating the same). 
31. Id. arts. 19–20. The default rules differ for two particular subsets of treaties. First, for treaties 
where it appears that “the application of the treaty in its entirety between all the parties is an essential 
condition of the consent of each one to be bound by the treaty,” the unanimity rule applies. Id. art. 
20(2). Second, where the treaty is “a constituent instrument of an international organization,” the 
reservation must be accepted by the organization. Id. art. 20(3). 
32. Id. art. 20(4)(b). 
320 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 53:309 
demand that other states perform this obligation.33 Fourth, the Vienna 
Convention establishes very different timing rules with regard to the 
making of a reservation and the subsequent withdrawal of a reservation. 
Making reservations is a “use it or lose it” game: states can only do so at 
the time they join the treaty.34 By contrast, states can withdraw 
reservations at any time.35 
Because the Vienna Convention establishes only default rules, treaty 
negotiators have the option of establishing different rules regarding 
reservations in the treaty they are negotiating. Importantly, treaty 
negotiators can contract away from the law of reservations by using what 
are called “no-reservation clauses.”36 For example, the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change provides flatly that “[n]o 
reservations may be made to the Convention.”37 Other no-reservation 
clauses can leave states with somewhat more flexibility. As I discuss in the 
next section, some treaties have clauses banning traditional reservations, 
but permit states to opt out under a negotiated option. Still other treaties 
contain what I will call weak no-reservation clauses: clauses that do not 
fully ban reservations, but nonetheless set stricter limits on their use than 
the Vienna Convention’s default rules do. This category includes clauses 
that ban reservations to which a certain percentage of state parties object,38 
and clauses that prohibit reservations to certain portions of a treaty.39 
Finally, some treaties contain exactly the opposite of no-reservation 
                                                          
33. See id. art. 21 (drawing certain finer differences between the reserving states’ relationship with 
accepting and objecting states); see also Swaine, supra note 11, at 319–20. 
34. See Vienna Convention, supra note 15, art. 19. Here and throughout this article, I use “join” as 
shorthand for signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding. Although signature does not 
necessarily give rise to membership in the treaty, and the default rule is that reservations made at 
signature must be confirmed at ratification, see id. art. 23(2), for my purposes I do not treat it 
separately here. 
35. See id. art. 22. 
36. The use of no-reservation clauses has led in part to the rise of “declarations” by states at the 
time of ratification. See generally Int’l Law Comm’n, Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties in 
UNITED NATIONS, YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 2011 (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at § 1, 4.7), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/1_8_2011.pdf [hereinafter 
Guide to Practice] (outlining the distinctions between declarations and reservations and offering a 
framework for distinguishing between the two). Consideration of declarations falls beyond the scope 
of this Article. 
37. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 24, opened for signature June 4, 1992, 1771 
U.N.T.S. 107. 
38. E.g., International Convention to Facilitate the Importation of Commercial Samples and 
Advertising Material art. 14, Nov. 7, 1952, 8 U.S.T. 1637, 221 U.N.T.S. 255 (imposing a unanimity 
rule); Convention Concerning Customs Facilities for Touring art. 20, June 4, 1954, 8 U.S.T. 1294, 
276 U.N.T.S. 230 (banning reservations unless a majority agrees to them upon signature, or less than 
one-third object upon ratification). 
39. E.g., Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons art. 38, Sept. 28, 1954, 360 
U.N.T.S. 130 (allowing reservations at the time of joining except as to an enumerated list of articles). 
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clauses: clauses that explicitly permit states to make reservations to the 
treaty.40  
B. Negotiated Options 
Negotiated options are the under-studied cousins of treaty reservations. 
Although negotiated options have received attention in the context of 
specialized or regional international organizations where they are 
frequently used, (such as the ILO, the Council of Europe, and the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law),41 outside of these limited 
contexts scholars of treaty design tend to overlook them or treat them as 
asides to treaty reservations.42 
Negotiated options have much in common with treaty reservations, but 
also important differences. Like reservations, negotiated options provide 
states with flexibility, but unlike reservations, this flexibility is explicitly 
negotiated for and relates only to specified provisions. Negotiated options 
thus come with more certainty than traditional reservations. As the 
dissenters in the Reservations to the Genocide Convention Case observed long 
ago, the object and purpose test for reservations is unsatisfyingly vague, 
and states attaching reservations can lack certainty as to whether their 
                                                          
40. In this category, I include both treaties that simply state that reservations are permitted, for 
example, Tampere Convention on the Provision of Telecommunication Resources for Disaster 
Mitigation and Relief Operations art. 14, June 18, 1998, 2296 U.N.T.S. 5, and treaties that adopt the 
object-and-purpose test without specifying a number of objectors, for example, Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 46, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3. I also include treaties with 
clauses that explicitly permit reservations that are approved by the international organizations created 
by these treaties, as these clauses closely resemble the default rules with regard to treaties that create 
international organizations, discussed supra note 31. E.g., Agreement Establishing the Asia-Pacific 
Institute for Broadcasting Development art. 18, Aug. 12, 1977, 1216 U.N.T.S. 81. 
41. See Sia Spiliopoulou Akermark, Reservation Clauses in Treaties Concluded within the Council of 
Europe, 48 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 479 (1999) (mentioning the use of negotiated options in the Council 
of Europe); W. Paul Gormley, The Modification of Multilateral Conventions by Means of ‘Negotiated 
Reservations’ and Other ‘Alternatives’: A Comparative Study of the ILO and Council of Europe—Part One, 39 
FORDHAM L. REV. 59, 67 (1970) (mentioning the use of negotiated options in the ILO); W. Paul 
Gormley, The Modification of Multilateral Conventions by Means of ‘Negotiated Reservations’ and Other 
‘Alternatives’: A Comparative Study of the ILO and Council of Europe—Part Two, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 413 
(1971) (mentioning the use of negotiated options in the Council of Europe); Georges A. L. Droz, Les 
reserves et les faculties dans les Conventions de La Haye de droit international prive, 1969 RCDIP 381 
(mentioning the use of negotiated options in the Hague Conference). 
42. E.g., Swaine, supra note 11; Redgwell, supra note 11; Catherine Logan Piper, Reservations to 
Multilateral Treaties: The Goal of Universality, 71 IOWA L. REV. 295 (1985); see also AUST, supra note 10, at 
125–77 (discussing opt-out clauses in a chapter on treaty reservations but focusing primarily on 
traditional reservations). Leading casebooks similarly tend to give short shrift to treaty options. E.g., 
LORI F. DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 477–90 (2001); 
JEFFREY K. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 69–74 (2006). An 
unusually detailed discussion of negotiated options occurs in Laurence R. Helfer, Response, Not Fully 
Committed? Reservations, Risk, and Treaty Design, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 367, 375–79 (2006) (noting that 
environmental treaties and the ILO frequently use negotiated options and suggesting that the 
phenomenon may be more wide spread). 
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reservations meet the test.43 By contrast, negotiated options offer a high 
degree of certainty: if a treaty presents states with a negotiated option, then 
it is perfectly clear that states can exercise their rights either way in 
accordance with the option. Relatedly, while states can object to 
reservations made by another state, they cannot legitimately object to 
another state’s exercise of a negotiated option, as that state’s right to 
exercise the option is an explicitly negotiated term in the treaty.44 
Negotiated options can take various forms. Here, I briefly describe two 
of the most common forms — opt-in and opt-out clauses — and note 
some other variations. 
1. Opt-in Clauses  
Opt-in clauses allow states to commit to obligations beyond those 
undertaken through simple treaty ratification. These clauses typically 
provide that a state may declare that it takes on the additional obligation 
contained in the clause. 
The most well-known treaty opt-in clause is Article 36(2) of the Statute 
of the ICJ, which provides that “[t]he states parties to the present Statute 
may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and 
without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same 
obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes” concerning 
international law.45 Like almost all opt-in clauses that I have seen, the 
language makes clear that a treaty party can opt in “at any time,” not 
simply at the time that state joins the treaty.46 This feature allows states 
that have undertaken only the basic treaty obligations at the time of joining 
to embrace the additional obligations later. While some opt-in clauses also 
provide explicitly that states can withdraw their opt-ins at any time, Article 
36(2) does not explicitly authorize the withdrawal of an opt-in.47 
2. Opt-out Clauses  
Opt-out clauses explicitly authorize states to disavow parts of a treaty. A 
state must affirmatively declare that it is taking advantage of an opt-out 
clause; otherwise, it will be subject to the legal obligation referred to in that 
clause. The presumption is thus the opposite from that in opt-in clauses, 
                                                          
43. Reservations to the Genocide Convention Case, 1951 I.C.J. at 43 (dissenting opinion of Judges 
Guerrero, McNair, Read, and Hsu Mo). 
44. Guide to Practice, supra note 36.  
45. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36(2), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 
1179. 
46. Id. 
47. Article 36(2) does make clear, however, that states can frame their opt-ins so as to reserve the 
right of withdrawal. See id. Moreover, in practice the right of withdrawal from Article 36(2) is well 
established. See AUST, supra note 10, at 291. 
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which require states to affirmatively declare that they are taking on 
additional legal obligations. 
Opt-out clauses come in various forms. The UN Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, for example, provides for dispute 
settlement through arbitration or the ICJ, but further states that “[e]ach 
State Party may, at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance, or 
approval of or accession to this Convention, declare that it does not 
consider itself bound by” these provisions for dispute settlement — in 
which case other states will not be bound against that state.48 A state opt-
out under this provision will look a lot like a traditional treaty reservation, 
in that the state can only opt out at the time it joins the treaty. Some opt-
out clauses, however, allow states to opt out at any time (sometimes upon 
a certain amount of notice) rather than simply when they join the treaty.49 
The UN Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International 
Trade, for example, provides that state parties can opt out of certain 
provisions “at any time” after giving six months notice.50 Most opt-out 
clauses further provide that states may withdraw their opt-outs (that is, opt 
back in) at any time. 
Opt-out clauses share a great deal in common with both treaty 
reservations and opt-in clauses. Like treaty reservations and unlike opt-in 
clauses, they provide a way for states to disavow certain obligations under 
a treaty. Unlike treaty reservations and like opt-in clauses, however, state 
opt-outs under opt-out clauses have been expressly authorized by the 
treaty negotiators.51 Indeed, opt-out clauses are sometimes found in 
conjunction with no-reservation clauses that bar any reservations to the 
treaty other than those explicitly set forth in opt-out clauses. The 
International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations, for example, provides that 
“no reservation may be made to this Convention” but qualifies that this 
language is “without prejudice” to four specific opt-out clauses.52  
                                                          
48. United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime art. 35, Dec. 12, 2000, 
2225 U.N.T.S. 209. 
49. Effectively, this can be done in two ways. First, by specifying in the opt-out clause that the 
opt-out can be done at any time. Alternatively, it can be done by providing in a denunciation clause 
that states can separately denounce this portion of a treaty. 
50. United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade arts. 
39–42, Dec. 12, 2001, G.A. Res. 56/81, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/81 (Jan. 31, 2002). This 
Convention is not yet in force, as only one state has ratified it to date. 
51. Despite the parallels between opt-in and opt-out clauses, the ILC’s Guide to Practice draws a 
stark distinction between them. It treats state opt-outs under opt-out clauses as treaty reservations 
(where these opt-outs must be made at the time of joining) but ignores state opt-ins under opt-in 
clauses as outside its scope. Guide to Pracitce, supra note 35, §1.1.6, §1.5.3. Despite the Guide to 
Practice and for the sake of convenience, in this paper I use “treaty reservations” to refer narrowly 
only to reservations made outside the context of opt-out clauses. 
52. International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and 
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3. Variations 
Straightforward opt-in and opt-out clauses are not the only types of 
negotiated options. Some treaties use opt-in or opt-out clauses that have 
restrictions on their use. A 1953 narcotics control treaty, for example, has 
an opt-in clause available only to certain countries,53 and the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court has an opt-out clause that is valid only 
for seven years after ratification.54 Negotiated options can also take the 
form of requiring states to choose from among a set of options. For 
example, the Law of the Sea Convention allows states to choose their 
preferred dispute settlement body from a set of four options, but requires 
that they accept the jurisdiction of at least one of these options.55 
Finally, some treaties enable states to take on additional obligations 
through the use of optional protocols. To give one example, the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations has an Optional Protocol on the 
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes that states can ratify separately if they 
wish to accept ICJ jurisdiction over disputes arising out of the main 
treaty.56 Where these optional protocols are done at the same time as the 
main treaty and are available only to treaty parties, they are functionally 
similar to opt-in clauses. As I discuss in Part III, however, the choice of 
form between opt-in clauses and optional protocols may nonetheless 
prove significant in terms of state participation. 
C. Negotiators’ Choices of Treaty Options 
As the prior sections have shown, treaty negotiators have powerful 
tools available for controlling the ways in which states can vary the depth 
of their consent to treaties. This section offers a birds-eye picture of how 
treaty negotiators make use of these tools by quantifying the use of opt-in, 
opt-out, and no-reservation clauses in an important and wide-ranging 
collection of multilateral treaties. 
Specifically, I look at treaties from the database of Multilateral Treaties 
Deposited with the Secretary-General (MTDSG) of the United Nations.57 
                                                                                                                                      
Broadcasting Organisations art. 31, opened for signature Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43. 
53. Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production of, 
International and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of Opium art. 5(2), June 23, 1953, 456 U.N.T.S. 3 
(providing that those countries which the protocol permitted to produce opium could agree through 
a declaration made at any time to cease being opium producers).  
54. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 124, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3. 
55. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 287, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3. 
56. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, concerning the 
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, opened for signature Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 241. 
57. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/DB.aspx?path=DB/MTDSG/page1_en.xml&menu=MTDSG (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2012). Here and in Part II, I use only data from before July 1, 2011. 
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This dataset contains treaties for which the Secretary-General performs 
depository functions. The MTDSG is a selective group of treaties: the 
Secretary-General typically is willing to serve as the depository only for 
“open multilateral treaties of worldwide interest” or regional agreements 
negotiated under UN auspices.58 It includes many of the world’s most 
important treaties in twenty-nine subject matters, including human rights, 
the environment, arms control, transportation, and commodities.59 The 
MTDSG contains over 500 entries, and, for reasons explained in a 
footnote, I work with a set of 326 treaties from these entries.60 
Table 1 shows how often treaty negotiators contract out of the default 
law of treaty reservations. Out of the 326 treaties just mentioned, I look 
only at the 276 of these in which the negotiations were finalized after 1951, 
since prior to the ICJ’s Reservations to the Genocide Convention Case, treaty 
                                                          
58. See UNITED NATIONS TREATY SECTION OF THE OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, SUMMARY OF 
PRACTICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AS DEPOSITORY OF MULTILATERAL TREATIES, at 49–55 
(1994), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/publications/practice/summary_english.pdf. 
The MTDSG treaties are not a random sample of multilateral treaties and thus cannot be taken as 
representative of all multilateral treaties. Rather, the results I offer here are important because they 
show how negotiated options are used in this collection of exceptionally important treaties. 
Specifically, the MTDSG contains: “(a) all multilateral treaties, the originals of which are deposited 
with the Secretary-General; (b) the Charter of the United Nations . . . ; (c) multilateral treaties 
formerly deposited with the Secretary-General of the League of Nations or other depositaries, to the 
extent that subsequent formalities or decisions affecting them have been taken within the framework 
of the United Nations; and (d) certain [other] pre-United Nations treaties . . .  which were amended 
by protocols adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations.” Id. at 2. The database 
includes treaties from 1904 to the present. Some of these treaties are no longer in force, and others 
have not entered into force. The Secretary-General’s practices as a depository are transparent and 
have closely tracked the changing law of treaty reservations. See id. at 1–2.  
59. For the categories, see Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, UNITED NATIONS 
TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx (last visited Nov. 4, 
2012). Of course, some important multilateral treaties have other depositories, such as the Geneva 
Conventions (for whom Switzerland serves as depository) or WTO Agreements (for whom the 
WTO Director-General serves as depository). See Switzerland as depositary state of the Geneva Conventions, 
FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/humlaw/gecons/gechde.html (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2012) (discussing Switzerland as depositary state of the Geneva Conventions); Final Act 
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations art. 6, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/03-fa.pdf. 
60. I have narrowed the database down to initial treaties and to protocols or agreements that are 
reasonably distinct from these treaties. More specifically, I have culled out entries that are (1) only 
depository lists; (2) amendments to treaties, protocols that simply set forth amendments to treaties, 
and subsequent versions of already listed treaties incorporating amendments; (3) regulations made 
pursuant to treaties (most notably the 126 separately listed regulations to a 1958 European treaty 
standardizing vehicle parts); (4) treaties that simply extend the duration of other treaties; and (5) 
relatively trivial protocols, such as ones specifying the location of an agency headquarters. Removing 
these entries gives a clearer sense of the overall arc of major treaty-making by preventing quite 
discrete changes to treaties from being counted as equivalent to the treaties themselves. It also has 
the added benefit of reducing the need for complicated judgment calls about coding the interactions 
between these entries and the initial treaties to which they relate. As with any selection, some calls 
were close ones and could reasonably have gone either way. 
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negotiators would presumably have viewed the unanimity rule as 
applicable.61 Table 1 gives both the percentage and number (in 
parentheses) of treaties that (1) have no specific clause about reservations; 
(2) have a clause affirmatively permitting reservations in line with the 
default rules or even more permissively (“pro-reservation clause”); or (3) 
have a no-reservation clause, with further sub-categorization as to whether 
this clause is absolute, implicitly or explicitly applies except with respect to 
negotiated opt-outs, or is weak.62  
 
Table 1: Treatment of Reservations in MTDSG Treaties after 1951 
 
No Clause (Default Rules) 48% (133) 
Pro-Reservation Clause 6% (16) 
No-Reservation Clause 46% (127) 
 – Strict   20% (55) 
 – Except Opt-Outs 22% (60) 
 – Weak 4% (12) 
 
As Table 1 shows, treaty negotiators are quite willing to depart from the 
default rules on treaty reservations and in fact do so in a slight majority of 
treaties. Importantly, most of these departures seek to restrict the flexibility 
available to states under the default rules through the use of absolute or 
qualified no-reservation clauses: 46% of the treaties contained such no-
reservation clauses. This impressively high percentage also suggests that 
the ICJ may have exaggerated the need for flexibility in multilateral 
conventions, given how frequently states contract back towards no-
reservations clauses. Put another way, while the ILO approach of banning 
treaty reservations except for specifically negotiated options failed to take 
hold in the law of treaties, it has proved exceedingly attractive to treaty 
negotiators in practice.  
Table 2 examines the frequency with which negotiators write certain 
negotiated options into treaties. More specifically, it looks at uses of opt-in 
or opt-out clauses in the main text of treaties. I take a conservative 
                                                          
61. See discussion supra notes 16, 23–26 and accompanying text. 
62. Several more nuances about this break-down are as follows. First, I do not try to distinguish 
between treaties that otherwise would follow the usual default rules and treaties that create 
international organizations that therefore would follow the default rules specific to such treaties, as 
discussed supra note 31. (Distinguishing between these two types of treaties is not always an easy 
task.) Second, I focus here only on the right of reservations to the treaty under consideration and not 
to its annexes. Third, this kind of categorization inevitably involves borderline choices; and 
reasonable people might make different calls on the margin. The important point here is less the 
precise percentages I provide than the overall sense they give of the high frequency with which no-
reservation clauses are used.  
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approach to counting opt-in and opt-out clauses, and exclude clauses that 
explicitly limit their applicability to specific states, to specific time periods, 
or impose other restrictions on their exercise.63  
 
Table 2: Opt-in and Opt-out Clauses in MTDSG Treaties 
 
Both 14%  (46) 
Opt-out 21%  (68) 
Opt-in 16%  (53) 
None 49%  (159) 
 
As Table 2 shows, negotiators are quite willing to use opt-out and opt-
in clauses. A slight majority (51%) of all the treaties in the dataset have one 
or more of such clauses. In terms of content, two types of opt-in and opt-
out clauses occur especially often. The first are territorial opt-in or opt-out 
clauses, whereby states can decide whether to apply the treaty to their 
dependent territories. Sixty treaties have territorial opt-in clauses and 
twenty-three have territorial opt-out clauses. (Most of these treaties are 
from the 1940s to 1970s, when colonialism was more prevalent.) The 
second and most common type of opt-in or opt-out clauses are dispute 
settlement clauses. Thirty-four treaties have opt-in clauses and seventy-two 
treaties have opt-out clauses regarding ICJ jurisdiction, arbitration, or 
some other compliance mechanism. (Where these clauses deal with state-
to-state disputes, they typically require reciprocity, that is, they apply only 
where both states have opted in or not opted out.) In addition to these 
two recurrent types of clauses, negotiators sometimes use opt-in or opt-
out clauses for treaty-specific substantive provisions. To give just one 
example, the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights has a provision banning the death penalty but 
provides that states may specifically reserve the right to apply the death 
penalty to certain crimes during wartime.64 
The willingness of treaty negotiators to use no-reservation clauses and 
negotiated options rather than simply relying on the default rules of treaty 
reservations may come as a surprise to scholars of treaty reservations. At 
the negotiation of the Vienna Convention, treaty expert Sir Ian Sinclair 
                                                          
63. I do, however, count as opt-out clauses any clauses that simply states that reservations may be 
made to specified articles of a treaty. (These clauses are sometimes known as reservation clauses. See 
Guide to Practice, supra note 36, commentary 1.1.6.) In addition, I count clauses that have no explicit 
limitations as to applicability but may in practice have actual ones — i.e., I count clauses allowing 
states to opt in or out of applying the treaty to their dependent territories, even though in practice 
these clauses are relevant only to states that have dependent territories in the first place. 
64. Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming 
at the abolition of the death penalty art. 2, opened for signature Dec. 15, 1989, 1642 U.N.T.S. 414. 
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remarked that “practical experience showed that, more often than not, [a] 
treaty was silent on the matter [of reservations], not necessarily because the 
negotiating States had ignored the question of reservations, but usually 
because they had been unable to reach an agreed solution.”65 Affirmative 
agreement is required to get beyond the default rules — and yet this survey 
has shown that more often than not, such affirmative agreement is reached 
with regard to both reservations clauses and treaty options. 
II. TREATY OPTIONS AND STATE RATIFICATION 
The prior Part discussed ways in which treaty negotiators can allow 
states to vary their formal commitments to multilateral treaties. In this 
Part, I turn to a related question: what treaty options should treaty 
negotiators use to best accomplish their design goals? More specifically, I 
investigate how the type of treaty option used by treaty negotiators relates 
to the substantive choices made by ratifying states. 
This issue has enormous implications for treaty design. If ratifying states 
make the same substantive decisions regardless of whether they are 
presented with an opt-in or opt-out clause, for example, then treaty 
negotiators need not worry about their choice between the two. On the 
other hand, if ratifying states make different substantive decisions when 
confronted with an opt-in clause than with an opt-out clause, then treaty 
negotiators need to be exceedingly alert in structuring a treaty. To create a 
treaty regime that most corresponds to their goals, they will need to 
understand the conditions under which presentation influences substance, 
and the ways in which it does so.  
To study the relationship between the type of treaty option used and 
states’ substantive choices, I look at two contexts in which states have 
responded to different types of treaty options that present them with 
similar substantive choices. First, I compare the extent to which states 
accept ICJ jurisdiction: (1) in treaties that contain clauses allowing states to 
opt-in to ICJ jurisdiction; (2) in treaties that contain clauses allowing states 
to opt-out of ICJ jurisdiction; and (3) in treaties that provide for ICJ 
jurisdiction but where traditional reservations are permitted. Second, I 
compare the extent to which states agree to two different forms of opt-in 
provisions used for compliance mechanisms in human rights treaties: (1) 
opt-ins done through clauses in the main text of the treaties; and (2) ones 
done through the use of optional protocols. As I show below, the data 
suggest that presentation matters tremendously under both of these 
comparisons. While I cannot rule out the possibility that the observed 
                                                          
65. Quoted in Swaine, supra note 11, at 325 n.105 (collecting more recent scholarly assertions 
suggesting that no-reservation clauses are not widely used). 
2013] TREATY OPTIONS  329 
differences stem solely from other causes, I think this is unlikely for the 
reasons discussed in each sub-section. 
A. ICJ Jurisdiction Clauses 
As discussed earlier, dispute resolution clauses are frequently framed as 
opt-in or opt-out clauses. Here, I look to see how states behave when 
confronted with different framings of dispute resolution clauses providing 
for ICJ jurisdiction. Specifically, I look at state responses to three different 
types of clauses: (1) clauses that allow states to opt in to ICJ jurisdiction; (2) 
clauses that allow states to opt out of ICJ jurisdiction; (3) and clauses that 
provide for ICJ jurisdiction with any specific opt-outs or opt-ins, but 
where the state is otherwise entitled to make reservations (either under the 
default rules or because the treaty specifically authorizes reservations). The 
treaties I examine come from the set of treaties discussed in the prior 
section. Of these treaties, twenty-five provide for ICJ jurisdiction through 
opt-in clauses in their main text, thirty-five provide for it through opt-out 
clauses (and have at least one ratifying state), and eight treaties made after 
1951 provide for ICJ jurisdiction without any opt-in or opt-out clauses, 
but do permit treaty reservations.66 
Figure 1 shows how these three approaches compare in terms of state 
participation in the ICJ clauses. For each approach, it shows the average 
percent of state treaty parties who have accepted ICJ jurisdiction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
66. The specifics of these dispute resolution clauses vary. Some provide solely for ICJ jurisdiction 
while others provide for it as one of several possible forms of dispute resolution; some give the ICJ 
jurisdiction only over limited issues within the treaty while others give it jurisdiction over all 
interpretive disputes arising from the treaty; and so forth. It is also worth noting that the treaties I 
look to here are not the only ones in my dataset that provide for some form of ICJ jurisdiction. For 
example, I do not use treaties from before 1951 that provide for jurisdiction of the ICJ (or its 
predecessor, the Permanent Court of Internationa Justice (PCIJ)) without negotiated options, since 
prior to the Reservations to the Genocide Convention Case the unanimity rule was widely thought to apply. I 
also do not include treaties that mandate participation in ICJ dispute-resolution clauses (i.e., by 
banning reservations), provide for ICJ jurisdiction in separate optional protocols (except to the extent 
that these contain further ICJ opt-in provisions), provide only for ICJ advisory opinions, provide for 
ICJ jurisdiction only if both states specifically consent to it at the time of the dispute, or follow the 
complicated jurisdictional system set out in the Law of the Sea Convention. Finally, I do not include 
treaties which no states have yet ratified.  
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The difference in state responses is stunning. On average, treaties with 
opt-in clauses are thoroughly ineffective at getting states to accept ICJ 
jurisdiction. For the twenty-five treaties that have ICJ opt-in clauses, only 
an average of 5% of treaty parties opt in to accept ICJ jurisdiction. For a 
particularly dismal example, consider the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It has 195 state parties —
more states than belong even to the United Nations — but only one of 
these states, the Netherlands, has opted in to the ICJ jurisdictional clause.67 
The clause is thus currently useless in practice, and has been so since the 
treaty was made in 1992.  
By contrast, ICJ opt-out clauses are associated with dramatically higher 
state participation rates. Across the thirty-five treaties where opt-out 
clauses are used, 80% of treaty parties accept ICJ jurisdiction on average. 
In other words, only 20% of treaty parties on average exercise their right 
to opt out. As examples, only 21 of 149 state parties to the 1984 
Convention Against Torture have taken advantage of the opt-out written 
                                                          
67. Depository Status of UNFCCC, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII~7&chapter
=27&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en (last visited Nov. 4, 2012). Like other environmental treaties with 
opt-in jurisdictional clauses, the UNFCCC allows states to opt in to either or both of ICJ jurisdiction 
or arbitration. The Netherlands has opted in to both and one other country, the Solomon Islands, 
has opted into to the arbitration provision. Id. 
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into its ICJ jurisdiction clause (meaning that 86% have accepted ICJ 
jurisdiction),68 and only 35 of 154 parties to the 2003 UN Convention 
Against Corruption have taken advantage of its ICJ opt-out clause 
(meaning that 77% have accepted ICJ jurisdiction).69 The states that opt 
out vary, but ones that do so frequently include Algeria, Bahrain, El 
Salvador, China, Cuba, India, Indonesia, Israel, Laos, Lithuania, Myanmar, 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, the 
United States, and Venezuela.  
Finally, the average state participation rate in ICJ jurisdiction clauses for 
the eight post-1951 treaties that generally permit reservations is the highest 
of all: 95%. Of the sixty-five parties to the 1956 Convention on the 
Recovery Abroad of Maintenance, for example, only Algeria and Argentina 
made reservations regarding the ICJ jurisdiction clause, leaving 97% of 
state treaty parties participating in the ICJ jurisdiction clause.70  
The stark differences in state participation rates between opt-in clauses 
and other forms of treaty options are similarly glaring when the data is 
viewed at the level of individual treaties. Figure 2 shows the relationship 
between the number of parties to a treaty and the percentage of state 
parties accepting the ICJ jurisdictional clause for the different types of 
treaty options. It shows that while state participation rates vary a bit within 
each type of treaty option (particularly where the treaty has fewer total 
state parties), opt-in clauses are almost always associated with far lower 
participation rates. Of the treaties with ICJ opt-in clauses, all except one 
have ICJ participation rates of only 13% or less. By contrast, all except two 
treaties with ICJ opt-out clauses have participation rates of 62% or 
higher,71 and all treaties with ICJ clauses where states could make 
traditional reservations have ICJ participation rates of 86% or higher.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
68. Depository Status of CAT, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
9&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Nov. 4, 2012).   
69. Depository Status of U.N. Convention Against Corruption, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XVIII-14& 
chapter=18&lang=en (last visited Nov. 4, 2012). 
70. Depository Status of the Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance, UNITED NATIONS 
TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src= 
TREATY&mtdsg_no=XX~1&chapter=20&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en (last visited Nov. 4, 2012). 
71. The two exceptions are treaties that each have only one treaty party to date. 
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These results show a powerful correlation between the form of treaty 
option and state participation rates, particularly when comparing opt-in 
clauses to other options. While these results do not prove a causal 
relationship between form and participation, they are highly suggestive of 
such a relationship. In Part III, I will present a positive argument for why I 
think a causal relationship exists — in other words, for why the form of 
treaty option matters enormously. As importantly, however, it is hard to 
think of a third factor that would fully account for the reliably impressive 
difference in participation rates.  
To begin with, I doubt that this difference is due entirely to selection 
effects. Although the issue is unlikely to be a hard-fought point of 
contention (given that both approaches will leave each state with the 
ability to embrace or evade ICJ jurisdiction), it may be that negotiators 
deliberately choose opt-in clauses for treaties where support for ICJ 
jurisdiction is weaker and opt-out clauses for treaties where such support is 
stronger in order to reduce overall transaction costs. But I am skeptical 
that this is the case to an important degree. Importantly, the text of many 
ICJ jurisdictional clauses imply that treaty negotiators have negotiating 
fatigue by the time they reach these clauses. They tend to take a heavily 
cut-and-paste-based approach in selecting their negotiated options, usually 
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adopting whatever was done in prior treaties in the same subject area. 
Most of the environmental treaties, for example, use a cookie-cutter opt-in 
clause, and most of the penal matters treaties use a cookie-cutter opt-out 
clause.72 This suggests that treaty negotiators do not devote a lot of time or 
thought to how they structure optional jurisdictional clauses.73 Instead, as 
other scholars have also observed, treaty negotiators tend to rely on 
boilerplate for these and other final clauses.74  
Moreover, even assuming that negotiators consciously choose opt-in 
clauses where there is less support for ICJ jurisdiction and opt-out clauses 
where there is more, I doubt this choice would fully explain the vast 
disparity in state participation rates. If deliberate decision making were the 
principal cause of the difference between opt-in and opt-out participation 
rates, presumably some of these negotiating decisions would be close calls. 
We would therefore expect to see some treaties with ICJ participation rates 
of close to 50%, since the parties in a “close call” negotiation would be 
roughly evenly split between parties which wanted ICJ jurisdiction, and 
those that did not. But this has not proved true in practice. Instead, as 
Figure 2 shows, there are virtually no treaties with ICJ participation rates 
close to 50%. Indeed, there is only one treaty where between 13% and 62% of state 
parties have accepted ICJ jurisdiction. The vast disparity between participation 
rates in opt-in treaties and opt-out treaties suggests that something other 
than shrewd negotiating decisions must account for much of the 
difference.  
I also do not think that the subject matter of the treaties fully accounts 
for the difference in participation rates. As mentioned, there is indeed a 
connection between the subject matter of a treaty and the type of treaty 
                                                          
72. The environmental treaties typically provide that a party can opt in to either or both of ICJ 
jurisdiction and arbitration (using virtually identical language across treaties). The penal matter 
treaties typically provide for arbitration with ICJ jurisdiction as a fallback and allow parties to opt out 
of either or both (also using virtually identical language across treaties). My review of state 
declarations indicates that states opt in or opt out of the arbitration provisions at close to the same 
rates that they opt in or out of ICJ jurisdictional provisions.  
73. Even in the drafting of perhaps the most important optional treaty clause anywhere — 
Article 36 of the Statute of the ICJ — there was little discussion on the merits of opt-out clauses 
versus opt-in clauses. Instead, the debate centered on whether ICJ jurisdiction should apply to all 
parties or instead be available through an opt-in clause. The prospect of using an opt-out approach 
came up once in the lengthy deliberations, but was not considered in any depth. See U.N. Comm. of 
Jurists, Report on Draft of Statute of an International Court of Justice Referred to in Chapter VII of the Dumbarton 
Oaks Proposal, (April 20, 1945) in 14 Doc. U.N. Conf. on Int’l Org. 648, 667 (1945) (observing that the 
Egyptian delegate floated the possibility of an opt-out clause as a compromise and simply stating that 
the Committee did not accept this view).  
74. E.g., Kal Raustiala, Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 387, 430 n.224 (2000) (referencing “boilerplate” ICJ dispute resolution provisions); 
RONALD B. MITCHELL, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 129 (2010) (noting 
that “the non-substantive parts of [environmental] agreements including amendment, entry into 
force, and withdrawal clauses are often treated as boilerplate, reading almost identically across a wide 
range of agreements”). 
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option used. The twenty-five treaties with ICJ opt-in clauses fall into five 
subject matter classifications, but most of them — nineteen — are 
environmental treaties. The thirty-five treaties with ICJ opt-out clauses 
cover eight subject matters, including twelve penal matters treaties, eleven 
transportation treaties, and four human rights treaties.75 It could be that 
for some reason states are exceptionally reluctant to accept ICJ jurisdiction 
for environmental treaties and this in turn is what causes ICJ participation 
rates to be so low with regard to the opt-in clauses in these treaties. Even 
setting aside the obvious limits of this explanation — which would not 
explain, for example, why there are similarly low participation rates in the 
non-environmental treaties with ICJ opt-in clauses — I find it unlikely for 
two reasons.  
First, the category of environmental treaties is a broad one. It covers 
treaties dealing with localized problems arising from industrial accidents, 
treaties dealing with global problems like climate change, treaties focused 
on the procedures of access to environmental information, and many 
other quite dissimilar treaties.76 Given this, it is hard to pin down an all-
encompassing rationale for why states would be resistant to ICJ 
jurisdiction in environmental treaties. For example, one could opine that 
states avoid ICJ jurisdiction because environmental problems are often 
collective rather than bilateral — but in fact some environmental treaties 
do deal with trans-boundary issues that are likely to give rise to localized, 
bilateral disagreements, rather than collective ones.  
Second, even treating environmental treaties as a cohesive category, it is 
unclear why states would be so much more reluctant to accept ICJ 
jurisdiction in environmental treaties than in treaties addressing penal 
matters or human rights. The parallel with human rights treaties is 
particularly instructive. Human rights treaties, like many environmental 
treaties, deal with collective rather than bilateral concerns, and they present 
even greater intrusions on state sovereignty interests than do 
environmental treaties.77 If anything, one would thus expect states to be 
more reluctant to accept ICJ jurisdiction for human rights treaties than for 
environmental treaties — if one considers only the subject matter of the 
treaties and does not also consider the type of negotiated option used.  
Finally, neither the number of treaty parties, nor the date at which the 
treaty was made explain the effect on participation rates. As Figure 2 
                                                          
75. Both ICJ opt-in and opt-out clauses can be found in only one subject matter — privileges and 
immunities, diplomatic and consular relations.  
76. See generally U.N. Treaty Collection, Chapter XXVII, Environment, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=27&subid=A&lang=en (listing all the treaties included 
in this grouping). 
77. Hari M. Osofsky, Learning from Environmental Justice: A New Model for International Environmental 
Rights, 24 STAN. ENVTL L.J. 71, 80 (2005). 
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shows, the number of treaty parties does not account for this difference, as 
it appears in both treaties with fewer parties (often regional treaties) and 
ones to which most countries in the world belong. Furthermore, my 
research has shown that the date at which a treaty was made also does not 
substantially account for this difference in participation.78  
In short, my findings suggest that opt-in ICJ jurisdictional clauses result 
in dramatically lower state participation than do ICJ jurisdictional clauses 
framed as opt-outs or to which states can make traditional reservations. 
The choice of form matters, and matters enormously. It may also be that 
the choice of treaty option also drives the difference in average 
participation rates between opt-out ICJ jurisdictional clauses (80%) and 
ones to which states simply can make traditional reservations (95%), but I 
am not as certain on this point. For one thing, this comparison rests on 
evidence from fewer treaties, with only eight treaties allowing traditional 
reservations. For another, the differences between opt-out clauses and 
traditional reservations go beyond presentation. As discussed earlier, where 
traditional treaty reservations are used, other states can object to these 
reservations and prevent the entry into force of the entire treaty between 
themselves and the reserving state. Indeed, with some of these eight 
treaties, certain states did object to reservations to the ICJ jurisdictional 
clauses and prevented the treaties from entering into force between 
themselves and the reserving state.79 States might not want to risk this 
result and therefore be more reluctant to make traditional reservations 
than they would be to exercise their right to opt-out under an opt-out 
clause.  
One final point bears mention. Figure 2 reveals that the ICJ opt-in 
clause in one particular treaty has a much higher participation rate — 
34% — than all the other such treaties. This treaty is the Statute of the 
                                                          
78. In the 1980s, for example, three treaties with opt-in clauses were completed, as were three 
treaties with opt-out clauses. There is considerable overlap in the states participating in these treaties 
(as shown by the fact that one of the treaties with opt-ins has over 190 parties, and one of the treaties 
with opt-outs has over 180 parties). Although these six treaties were written in the same decade, 
striking differences in participation remain. Less than 3% of participants in each of the opt-in treaties 
have accepted ICJ jurisdiction, while over 85% of participants in each of the opt-out treaties have 
done so.   
79. E.g., Depository Status of the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY &mtdsg_no=XVI-
1&chapter=16&lang=en (last visited Nov. 4, 2012) (noting various objections to reservations made 
to Article 9 of the treaty, which was the ICJ jurisdiction clause). This treaty specifically provides that 
no treaty relationship arises between reserving states and states which object to the reservations. See 
Convention on the Political Rights of Women art. 7, Mar. 31, 1953, 193 U.N.T.S. 135. Since the time 
of this treaty (and others that I look at here), a stronger consensus may have developed in 
international law that reservations to dispute settlement mechanisms are usually not incompatible 
with a treaty’s object and purpose. See Guide to Practice, supra note 35, at § 3.1.13. But see Jacob Katz 
Cogan, The 2010 Judicial Activity of the International Court of Justice, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 477, 490–91 
(2011) (suggesting that at least one ICJ justice thinks otherwise). 
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International Court of Justice, as to which which 66 out of 192 state 
parties to the Statute have opted into ICJ jurisdiction.80 This comparatively 
high percentage is especially fascinating because the opt-in clause in the 
Statute of the ICJ is by far the most significant ICJ opt-in clause in any 
treaty. It gives the ICJ jurisdiction over any international law dispute 
between states that have both opted in81 (whereas other ICJ opt-in clauses 
at most give the ICJ jurisdiction only in relation to the subject matter of 
the specific treaty at issue).82 In other words, states have proved more 
willing to opt in to the greater obligation contained in the Statute of the 
ICJ’s opt-in clause than to the more modest obligations contained in ICJ 
opt-in clauses in other treaties. This is a puzzle, and one to which I will 
return to briefly in Part III.  
B. Compliance Mechanisms in Human Rights Treaties 
Treaty options are heavily used in human rights treaties. Scholars of 
treaty design tend to focus their attention on reservations to human rights 
treaties, but negotiated options frequently appear in these treaties as well. 
Many of the nine “core” human rights treaties open to universal 
participation83 employ a mix of negotiated options in relation to dispute 
resolution. Besides opt-out clauses providing for ICJ jurisdiction in certain 
contexts, these treaties frequently allow states to opt in to one or both of 
two other separate but related compliance mechanisms. Here, I look to see 
how form relates to participation with regard to these two mechanisms. 
Because the number of treaties is small, my analysis rests not only on 
                                                          
80. Declarations Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the ICJ under Art. 36(2) of the Statute of the 
ICJ, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/pages/ 
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=I-4&chapter=1&lang=en (last visited Nov. 5, 2012). 
81. Article 36 thus reduces the importance of other ICJ jurisdictional clauses, as it can provide an 
alternate basis for ICJ jurisdiction where both countries have opted in under it.  
82. Another exception is Article 66 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which 
provides for ICJ jurisdiction over disputes about a treaty’s invalidity or a party’s withdrawal from a 
treaty. 
83. According to the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, the nine “core” 
human rights treaties are the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), The Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW), the International Convention for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED), and the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). See The Core Human Rights Instruments, OFFICE OF THE U.N. 
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/index.htm#core 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2012). All these treaties belong to the MTDSG, as the Secretary-General acts as 
their depository. CRC is the only one of these treaties not to employ either of the optional 
compliance mechanisms discussed in this section. 
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participation rates but also on qualitative information drawn from the 
drafting histories.  
First, five of these treaties enable states to opt in to a system whereby a 
committee of experts can hear complaints between states. (A sixth treaty 
simply includes this system without the need for opt-in.)84 For example, 
Article 41 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) provides that: 
A State Party to the present Covenant may at any time declare 
under this article that it recognizes the competence of the [Human 
Rights] Committee to receive and consider communications to the 
effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not 
fulfilling its obligations under the present Covenant. 
Communications under this article may be received and considered 
only if submitted by a State Party which has made a declaration 
recognizing in regard to itself the competence of the Committee. . . 
. A declaration may be withdrawn at any time [as to future 
complaints] by notification to the Secretary-General.85 
This compliance mechanism does not carry any sanctions with it. 
Rather, the Committee’s role is to facilitate a satisfactory resolution 
between the states using its good offices and a limited reporting power.86 
The substance of this provision closely resembles those set forth in the 
other treaties.87 So does its form — three of the other treaties with similar 
                                                          
84. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 11, 
Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter ICERD].   
85. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 41, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
86. See id. More specifically, if the states fail to work the matter out among themselves within nine 
months of the filing of the complaint or through the Committee’s good offices, the Committee can 
meet to consider the complaint and prepare a report that is “confine[d] to a brief statement of facts.” 
Id.; see also id. art. 42 (providing for a further conciliation process if both states agree to it at that 
time).  
87. The opt-in clauses in the various treaties mostly look like cut-and-paste versions of each 
other, but there are some minor differences. See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 21, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 
[hereinafter CAT] (tracking the ICCPR provisions almost word for word except without the further 
conciliation process set forth in ICCPR art. 42); International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families art. 76, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 
3 [hereinafter ICRMW] (tracking CAT art. 21 except further allowing the Committee to share its 
“views” with the states involved in a complaint); Optional Protocol to International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 10, G.A. Res. 63/117, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 
10, 2008). It should be note noted that ICESCR art. 10, like ICRMW art. 76, is not yet in force. Also 
of note is that CPED is the least like the three previous treaties in two respects. First, while it tracks 
the others in allowing states to “declare that [they] recognize[] the competence of the Committee to 
receive and consider communications in which a State Party claims that another State Party is not 
fulfilling its obligations under this Convention,” it has no further provisions for how the Committee 
is to deal with these complaints. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance art. 32, G.A. Res 61/177, U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/177 (Dec. 20, 2007) 
[hereinafter CPED]. Second, where all the other treaties (except ICERD which does not use an opt-
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compliance mechanisms present them through opt-in clauses within the 
text of the core treaty, while a fourth presents it through an opt-in clause 
within the text of a broader optional protocol. 
Second, eight of the nine human rights treaties enable states to opt in to 
a system whereby a committee of experts can consider complaints brought 
against them by individuals. By way of example, Article 14 of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD) provides that: 
A State Party may at any time declare that it recognizes the 
competence of the Committee [on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination] to receive and consider communications from 
individuals or groups of individuals within its jurisdiction claiming 
to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights 
set forth in this Convention. . . . A declaration may be withdrawn at 
any time [as to future complaints] by notification to the Secretary-
General.88 
As with the state-to-state complaints, the Committee has no authority 
to impose sanctions on states. Its power is limited to considering a case, 
making recommendations to the individual and state at issue, and 
summarizing the case in its annual report.89 Once again, the substance of 
these provisions resembles those in the other treaties.90 Interestingly, 
                                                                                                                                      
in) explicitly provide that states which have opted in can opt out again at any time, CPED is silent on 
whether opt-in declarations can be later withdrawn. See id. 
88. ICERD, supra note 84, art. 14, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
89. Id. In addition, there are exhaustion requirements before CERD (the monitoring committee) 
can consider a case. Id. 
90. The provisions about individual complaints are largely cut-and-paste versions of each other, 
but there is more variation across treaties than for the state-to-state complaint provisions. See generally 
Optional Protocol to International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 
63/117, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/117 (Dec. 10, 2008) [hereinafter OP-ICESCR]; CPED, supra note 87, 
art. 31; Optional Protocol to Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 
61/611, U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/611 (Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter OP-CRPD]; Optional Protocol to 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Oct. 6, 1999, 2131 
U.N.T.S. 83 [hereinafter OP-CEDAW]; ICRMW, supra note 87, art. 77; CAT, supra note 87, art. 22; 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR-OP1]; ICERD, supra note 84, art. 14.  
Some variations relate to the time afforded for state responses to complaints, to the exact content 
of the exhaustion clauses (or other clauses constricting functional jurisdiction), and to whether 
groups as well as individuals may petition. Other variations are that CAT, ICRMW, CPED, and OP-
CRPD do not specify that their Committees should cover complaints in their annual reports; that 
CPED, OP-ICESCR, and OP-CEDAW authorize the Committees to recommend interim measures 
to the states; and that, as was true with its article on state-to-state complaints, CPED is silent on 
whether opt-in declarations can be later withdrawn.  
In addition, optional protocols come with somewhat greater obligations than opt-ins found in the 
text of the main treaty. All the optional protocols require some notice period prior to withdrawal: 
three months for ICCPR-OP1; six months for OP-ICESCR and OP-CEDAW; and one year for OP-
CRPD. OP-ICESCR and OP-CEDAW also explicitly require states to provide their Committees with 
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however, these provisions vary dramatically in their presentation. Three 
treaties besides ICERD use opt-in clauses within the main text. Four other 
treaties, however, present this compliance mechanism through an optional 
protocol to the core treaty. The ICCPR and the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) use optional protocols done at the 
same time as the core treaties, while ICESCR and the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) use optional 
protocols negotiated many years after the core treaties.  
Why do these extra commitments sometimes appear as opt-in clauses in 
the core human rights treaties and sometimes instead as optional protocols 
to the core treaties? The drafting history of the ICCPR gives us some clues 
as to how the use of these two different processes began.91 During its 
negotiation, the incorporation of a state-to-state complaint mechanism was 
mildly controversial.92 Some negotiators claimed that a mandatory 
mechanism would trigger sovereignty concerns for states and result in 
lower participation in the treaty overall.93 Accordingly, the parties agreed 
to make the mechanism available through an opt-in clause, which “[m]ost 
representatives . . . thought . . . would provide a satisfactory solution to the 
main problems raised during the debate.”94 When it came to designing a 
mechanism by which individuals could complain about their own states, 
however, the negotiators proved much more hesitant. They felt such a 
mechanism would be an even greater intrusion on state sovereignty and 
would erode the traditional state-to-state nature of international law.95 The 
Netherlands proposed another opt-in clause in the core text.96 Some 
delegates thought, however, that this proposal was still “dangerous” and 
might erode state participation in the treaty as a whole.97 They proposed 
using an optional protocol instead.98 The delegates recognized that they 
were debating an issue of form and that “the difference between an 
optional article and a separate protocol was legally unimportant.”99 
                                                                                                                                      
written responses to the Committees’ suggestions, to give publicity to the treaties as well as the 
Committees’ actions, and not to discriminate against complainants. Finally, OP-ICESCR, OP- 
CEDAW, and OP-CRPD also allow states to opt-in or opt-out of a system whereby their 
Committees can initiate investigations sua sponte.  
91. M.J. BOSSUYT, GUIDE TO THE ‘TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES’ OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CONVENTION ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1987). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 653 (quoting A/6546 para 413 (Third Committee 1966)). 
94. Id. The adoption of an optional state-to-state mechanism passed sixty-five to zero with 
twenty-three abstentions. The negotiators do not appear to have considered the use of an opt-out 
clause rather than an opt-in clause.  
95. Id. at 797. 
96. Id. at 796. 
97. Id. at 797–98. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 798–99. 
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Nonetheless, the states that favored a stronger human rights compliance 
regime wanted the individual complaint mechanism as an opt-in in the 
main text, while the other states preferred an optional protocol.100 After a 
close vote, the article was moved to an optional protocol.101  
For human rights advocates, then, the optional protocol was a second-
best alternative to the opt-in clause. Table 3 shows how states have 
responded to these different forms in practice. For each compliance 
mechanism used for each treaty, it gives both the percentage and fraction 
of treaty parties to the core treaty who have opted into the compliance 
mechanism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
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Table 3: State Participation in Optional Compliance Mechanisms in Human 
Rights Treaties 
 
 Main Text Opt-In Optional Protocol 
State-to-State 
Complaints 
Individual 
Complaints 
State-to-State 
Complaints 
Individual 
Complaints 
 
ICERD Mandatory 
31% 
(54/174) 
– – 
ICCPR 
29% 
(48/167) 
– – 
68% 
(114/167) 
ICESCR – – 
0% 
(0/160) 
2% 
(3/160) 
CEDAW – – – 
55% 
(102/187) 
CAT 
41% 
(60/147) 
44% 
(64/147) 
– – 
ICRMW 
2% 
(1/44) 
5% 
(2/44) 
– – 
CPED 
38% 
(11/29) 
34% 
(10/29) 
– – 
CRPD – – – 
61% 
(62/101) 
 Optional protocol negotiated subsequent to core treaty. 
 Available as an opt-in within the optional protocol.  
 
These results might well surprise human rights treaty negotiators. They 
show that, for the most part, states join optional protocols at much higher rates 
than they join opt-in clauses embedded in the text of a treaty. For all the compliance 
mechanisms created through opt-in clauses in the main text, less than half 
of state treaty parties have joined these mechanisms. By contrast, in three 
of the four treaties where optional protocols are used to set forth the 
compliance mechanism, well over half the treaty parties have joined these 
mechanisms.102  
                                                          
102. The exception is the optional protocol to ICESCR, which was adopted less than three years 
ago (long after the main treaty). 
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This difference is surprising for several reasons. First, as noted above, 
the difference in form between opt-in clauses and optional protocols is 
legally unimportant. Second, to the extent there are differences between 
the two mechanisms, they would seem to cut in favor of greater 
participation in the opt-in clauses set forth in the main texts. For one 
thing, the optional protocols tend to impose slightly stronger obligations 
(such as a notice period prior to withdrawal),103 and one might think states 
would prefer weaker obligations. For another, to the extent that optional 
protocols were used for the more controversial issues at the time of 
negotiation — as was done with regard to the ICCPR — one would think 
states would be less willing to join them. The ICCPR negotiators would 
doubtless be surprised to learn that of the 167 states that are parties to the 
ICCPR, only 29% have opted in to the state-to-state complaint mechanism 
contained in the main text, while 68% have joined the optional protocol 
establishing the individual complaint mechanism.  
It could be, of course, that the relationship between form and 
participation rates is caused solely by some third factor. For example, one 
could hypothesize that there is a selection effect — that treaty negotiators 
use optional protocols for more universally acceptable commitments and 
main-text opt-ins for more controversial ones. This seems implausible, 
however, in light of the ICCPR drafting history suggesting exactly the 
opposite.104 Another possibility is that the differences arise because 
different states are participating in the different treaties. My review of 
individual state decisions, however, suggests that this is not the case.105  
Yet another possibility is that the different human-rights subject matters 
of the various treaties give rise to different levels of willingness by states to 
accept compliance mechanisms in a way that just happens to conform 
quite closely with the form of opt-in used. It may be that states are simply 
more likely to accept a compliance mechanism with regard to political 
rights, civil rights, women’s rights, and the rights of disabled persons than 
                                                          
103. See supra note 90. In addition, because optional protocols are themselves treaties, they will 
require whatever domestic process is required for treaty ratification, while decisions about opt-in 
clauses might require less effort at the domestic level (i.e., be left to the discretion of the executive 
branch in some jurisdictions).  
104. My review of the literature on the negotiating history of the other treaties suggests that the 
ICCPR negotiation reflected an unusually considered decision about whether to use an opt-in clause 
or optional protocol. See NATAN LERNER, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL 
FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 82–86 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing the negotiations over the use 
of an opt-in clause for ICERD without suggesting that the parties considered using an optional 
protocol instead); MANFRED NOWAK & ELIZABETH MCARTHUR, THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A COMMENTARY 723–26 (2008) (discussing the same for CAT). 
105. For example, 141 of the 147 state parties to CAT are also parties to the ICCPR. Of these 
141 parties, 108 have ratified the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR while only 64 have opted in to 
CAT article 22. For another example, of the 102 state parties to the Optional Protocol to CEDAW, 
99 are also parties to ICERD but only 48 of these state parties have opted in to ICERD article 14.  
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they are with regard to torture, enforced disappearances, and to the rights 
of racial minorities.106 This is possible, although not obviously intuitive. I, 
however, do not think this provides a complete answer because it does not 
explain the demonstrated variations in state participation in the state-to-
state and individual compliance mechanisms. If we look at the three 
treaties that offer both the state-to-state and individual complaint forms of 
compliance mechanisms through opt-in clauses embedded in the main 
text, we see that the participation rates for these two mechanisms are 
roughly the same within each treaty. The greatest difference, found in the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (CPED), is a mere 4%: 38% of state parties have opted 
into state-to-state complaints and 34% into individual complaints. Yet the 
one treaty that separates their form — the ICCPR — shows an enormous 
spread: only 29% of states have opted into the state-to-state complaint 
mechanism, while 68% have joined the optional protocol enabling 
individual complaints. It is difficult to think of any reason other than form 
why states would accept the two mechanisms at roughly the same rates for 
most treaties and yet diverge so dramatically for the ICCPR. 
Given the limits of other explanations, it seems at least reasonably likely 
that framing may partially drive the differences in state participation rates. 
Optional protocols may simply be a better way of gaining state 
participation than are opt-in clauses embedded in the main text.107 Indeed, 
up to a point, variations in framing may even matter more than variations 
in substance. It is interesting that where the same framing is used (that is, 
opt-in clauses in the main text), state participation rates in the state-to-state 
complaint mechanisms and in the individual-complaint mechanisms are 
almost the same. If states are indeed more fearful of stronger substantive 
commitments, one might expect that there would be notably higher 
participation in the state-to-state complaint mechanism than in the 
individual-complaint mechanism. For one thing, the individual complaint 
mechanism lacks reciprocity, meaning that states accrue only obligations 
                                                          
106. Relatedly, it could be that states happen to receive more international rewards from joining 
one set of treaties than the other set of treaties. Recent work by Beth Simmons and Richard Nielson 
suggests, however, that international rewards are not tied to human rights treaty ratification. See 
Richard Nielson & Beth Simmons, Rewards for Rights Ratification? Testing for Tangible and Intangible 
Benefits of Human Rights Treaty Ratification, (Jan. 11, 2012) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1451630 (finding no statistically significant evidence that international 
rewards flow from the ratification of the human rights treaties they examined, including the Optional 
Protocol to the ICCPR and Article 22 of CAT).  
107. I have also looked to see whether state treaty parties participate in optional protocols 
providing for ICJ jurisdiction at higher rates than they do in opt-in clauses providing for ICJ 
jurisdiction. Four treaties in my MTDSG data set provide for ICJ jurisdiction through optional 
protocols made at the same time as the main treaties, and the average percentage of parties to the 
main treaties who also join these protocols is 43%. This is a strikingly higher number than the 5% 
average participation rate with regard to ICJ opt-in clauses embedded in the main text of treaties.  
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rather than rights under it. For another, the individual complaint 
mechanisms have proved much more powerful in action: the state-to-state 
complaint mechanisms have never been used in practice in any of these 
treaties,108 but the individual complaint mechanisms have received at least 
modest use.109 Yet states seem as willing (or, depending on presentation, 
more willing) to embrace the more significant obligation as the lesser one. 
III. TREATY OPTIONS IN THEORY 
Part II argued that the way in which treaty options are presented can 
affect ratifying states’ willingness to undertake them. This Part considers 
why this might be the case. What theory of state behavior can explain this 
result, and what else might it tell us about state decision-making? I begin 
by considering rational choice theory, which is probably the most popular 
model used by scholars of treaty design in international law and 
international relations today. I argue that it does a poor job of accounting 
for the results in Part II. Instead, I suggest these results are better 
explained through the lens of what Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein call 
“choice architecture”110 and explain why it might be appropriate to apply 
this framework, which is primarily grounded in individual decision-making, 
to state behavior.  
A. Rational Choice Theory 
Treaty design has received much attention from rational choice scholars 
in international law and international relations. Although these scholars 
vary in their particular approaches, they typically assume that states are 
unitary rational actors and further use this assumption to explain and 
predict state behavior in treaty-making, or to theorize about the best ways 
to structure treaty design. In their view, “design differences [between 
treaties] are not random. They are the result of rational purposive 
interactions, among states and other international actors to solve specific 
                                                          
108. Human Rights Bodies — Complaints Procedures, OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/index.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 
2012); cf. Scott Leckie, The Inter-State Complaint Procedure in International Human Rights Law: Hopeful 
Prospects or Wishful Thinking?, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 249, 255 (1988) (noting that state-to-state complaint 
mechanisms do get some use with regard to human rights in the Council of Europe and the ILO). 
109. See, e.g., Wade M. Cole, Hard and Soft Commitments to Human Rights Treaties, 1966–2000, 24 
SOCIOLOGICAL FORUM 563, 568 (2009) (noting the numerous individual complaints filed under the 
Optional Protocol to the ICCPR); Theo van Boven, The Petition System under the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Sobering Balance Sheet, in 4 MAX PLANCK 
YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 271, 275–77 (J.A. Frowein & R. Wulfrum eds., 2000) 
(discussing the relatively small number of individual complaints filed under ICERD article 14 and 
also noting the relatively small number of state parties who have opted in to article 14).  
110. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 3.  
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problems.”111 Among other things, rational choice theory has been used to 
analyze the default rules of treaty reservations,112 the use of dispute-
resolution clauses in treaties,113 and states’ use of reservations to human 
rights treaties.114 
Negotiated options, however, have received comparatively little 
attention from rational choice scholars. Some overlook negotiated options 
entirely. Andrew Guzman and Barbara Koremenos each have articles 
devoted to using a rational choice approach to explain when dispute 
resolution mechanisms are or are not included in international 
agreements.115 Yet neither scholar mentions the fact that these 
mechanisms are frequently framed as negotiated options or discusses how 
states respond to these negotiated options.116 Other scholars applying a 
rational choice approach note the existence of negotiated options but 
nowhere suggest that the choice between opt-in and opt-out clauses can 
affect state conduct. For example, in an article devoted to using a rational 
choice approach to assess why states do or do not accept ICJ jurisdiction 
in treaties, Emilia Powell and Sara Mitchell never consider whether the 
form of negotiated option might play a role.117  
Here, I consider the extent to which a rational choice approach can 
explain the results shown in Part II. I argue that it cannot explain these 
results — or, more precisely, that it cannot explain them in a persuasive 
way. This holds regardless of what precise version of the rational choice 
approach is used (for example, what assumptions one makes about 
underlying state preferences or how much one factors in reputational 
concerns). In particular, the behavior of ratifying states deviates notably 
from what rational choice theory would predict in at least two ways. 
First, rational choice theory does not provide a persuasive answer for 
why the framing of negotiated options strongly affects state participation 
rates. My findings demonstrate that states embrace ICJ jurisdiction in 
                                                          
111. RATIONAL DESIGN, supra note 2, at 2.  
112. Francesco Parisi & Vincy Fon, The Economics of Treaty Ratification, 5 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 209 
(2009); Francesco Parisi & Catherine Sevcenko, Treaty Reservations and the Economics of Article 21(2) of the 
Vienna Convention, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1 (2003); Swaine, supra note 11. 
113.  SARA MCLAUGHLIN MITCHELL & EMILIA JUSTYNA POWELL, DOMESTIC LAW GOES 
GLOBAL: LEGAL TRADITIONS AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS 129–63 (2011); Andrew T. Guzman, 
The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 
303 (2002); Barbara Koremenos, If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, 
Which Half Needs Explaining?, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (2007). 
114. Parisi & Sevcenko, supra note 112, at 20–24; GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 127–
28. 
115. See generally Guzman, supra note 113; Koremenos, supra note 113. 
116. Id. 
117. Emilia Justyna Powell & Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, The International Court of Justice and the 
World’s Three Legal Systems, 69 J. OF POLITICS 397 (2007); see also Swaine, supra note 11, at 325 (noting 
in passing the possibility of “optional clauses that states are free to accept or reject”).  
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treaties with opt-out clauses (80% participation on average) but decline to 
accept it in treaties with opt-in clauses (5% participation on average). If 
this finding reflects a causal connection at least partially, as I argue that it 
does, then this result is deeply puzzling from a rational choice perspective. 
It is explainable by rational choice theory only if (a) most states are 
rationally indifferent to the presence of an ICJ jurisdictional clause, or (b) 
there are significant reputational costs to opting out and no comparable 
reputational gains from opting in. Neither explanation seems likely. 
Ratifying states may well be mostly indifferent to the possibility of ICJ 
jurisdiction, given how little use the ICJ actually gets in practice118 and the 
absence of police power to ensure the enforcement of ICJ decisions. But it 
is hard to believe that rational states are so indifferent to ICJ jurisdiction 
that they will not bother to exercise the iota of effort required to make use 
of a negotiated option.119 While the chances of an ICJ case arising are 
small, they are not nil; and in any event acceptance of ICJ jurisdiction may 
trigger shadow-of-the-law effects.120  
The reputational argument is similarly unconvincing. Because 
negotiated options are negotiated, states who take advantage of them are 
playing by the book. To the extent that their reputations are implicated, it 
is not with regard to their procedural fair play but rather with regard to 
their overall willingness to accept the international rule of law, to the 
extent that this is embodied in ICJ jurisdiction. It is unclear whether such 
reputational effects should matter much to states under a rational choice 
approach.121 Even if they do, there is no compelling rational reason they 
would deter opting out yet not encourage opting in. If a state’s reputation 
                                                          
118. Counting both contentious and advisory cases, only 152 cases have been brought before the 
ICJ since it began in 1946. See Cases, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3 (last visited Nov. 11, 2012). For a detailed discussion of the role that 
ICJ jurisdictional clauses play in these cases, see Christian J. Tams, The Continued Relevance of 
Compromissory Clauses as a Source of ICJ Jurisdiction 161, in A WISER CENTURY? JUDICIAL DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT, DISARMAMENT AND THE LAWS OF WAR 100 YEARS AFTER THE SECOND HAGUE 
PEACE CONFERENCE (Thomas Giegerich ed., 2009). 
119. At the domestic level, the decision can be made in tandem with whatever other decisions are 
needed to effectuate the treaty’s ratification; and at the international level, the state need only to make 
a one-sentence declaration accompanying the deposit of a treaty ratification. 
120. See MITCHELL & POWELL, supra note 113, at 412 (suggesting that state acceptance of ICJ 
jurisdiction is correlated with a higher likelihood of reaching and complying with agreements over 
contentious issues). 
121. Jack Goldsmith, Eric Posner, and Andrew Guzman do not rely on the possibility of such 
global-citizen reputational effects, instead focusing on reputation as it relates to compliance or non-
compliance with specific legal obligations. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 2, at 100–104 
(focusing on reputation only in relation to compliance and further suggesting that it may not matter 
much even in that context); GUZMAN, supra note 2, at 33 (explaining that he is “interested primarily 
in a state’s reputation for compliance with international law rather than other types of reputation one 
can imagine”); see Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 HARV. J. INT’L L. 231, 238–241 
(2009) (noting differences between reputation regarding global standing and reputation regarding 
compliance with international law).  
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depends on the substance of whether or not it commits to ICJ jurisdiction, 
one would expect states to consistently embrace (or consistently reject) ICJ 
jurisdiction rather than to follow the default. It could be, of course, that a 
state’s reputation depends in part on whether it deviates from the default. 
From a rational perspective, this would follow since deviations from the 
default require more effort than adherence to the default and thus signal 
more information about a state’s interest in accepting the international rule 
of law. Accordingly, a state’s reputation for accepting the rule of law might 
suffer more from affirmatively opting out of ICJ jurisdiction than from 
passively failing to opt in to it. This argument is unpersuasive, however, in 
light of how little effort is actually required for states to exercise an opt-out 
or opt-in right. Because it takes little effort to opt in or opt out of a 
jurisdictional clause, under a rational choice approach the signal sent by 
this exercise of effort should be deemed a weak one.  
A rational choice approach similarly does not explain why ratifying 
states would be more likely to embrace human rights compliance 
mechanisms when they are presented in optional protocols rather than as 
opt-ins within a treaty’s main text. Both options require affirmative action 
from states — with perhaps even more required in the case of optional 
protocols — so indifference cannot be the cause. Perhaps one could argue 
that the difference is due to sheer ignorance: that at least some states are 
so indifferent to the content of human rights treaties that they only look at 
their titles and do not bother to read them. Such states might overlook 
opt-in clauses in the main text but notice optional protocols. Such 
behavior, however, would be reckless rather than rational: it is hard to 
imagine that states could rationally be so indifferent to the content of 
treaties that they would not even make the effort to read them.  
A second way in which my results rest uneasily with rational choice 
theory specifically involves the nature of ICJ dispute settlement clauses, as 
interpreted by the ICJ. These clauses typically turn on reciprocity: both 
states must embrace the dispute settlement clause in order for one state to 
use it against another. Importantly, however, this reciprocity is not 
measured at the time of the events giving rise to the suit, but at the time 
the suit is brought.122 For example, in the Right of Passage over Indian Territory 
Case, the ICJ exercised jurisdiction over Portuguese claims against India 
dating back at least to 1954 even though Portugal had only accepted the 
                                                          
122. E.g., Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria 
(Cameroon v. Nigeria), Judgment, 1998 I.C.J. 275, ¶ 23–27 (June 11) (reaffirming multiple prior 
rulings in finding that, for purposes of Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, reciprocity is measured at the 
time a suit is brought). States have some power to change this approach: for example, many states 
have attached declarations to their opt-ins under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute providing that other 
states can only sue them if certain timing conditions are satisfied. See MITCHELL & POWELL, supra 
note 113, at 168–169.  
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ICJ’s jurisdiction under Article 36(2) of the Statute of the ICJ on 
December 19, 1955.123 This structure creates a classic Prisoners’ Dilemma. 
A rational state would presumably favor the existence of a dispute 
settlement mechanism where it wishes to sue another state, but not where 
it might itself be sued.124 Thus, the best strategy for such a state would be 
to wait to opt in to an ICJ jurisdictional clause until it wishes to sue a 
participating state (if there is an opt-in clause) or alternatively to opt out of 
an ICJ jurisdictional clause initially and opt back in only when it wishes to 
sue a participating state (if there is an opt-out clause). If all states were to 
act rationally, then one would expect no states to embrace ICJ jurisdiction 
available through negotiated options, regardless of whether opt-in or opt-
out clauses are used.  
In practice, however, ratifying states confronted with opt-out clauses do 
not act in accordance with this prediction. As discussed above, most of 
these states accept ICJ jurisdiction rather than opting out. Of course, some 
states do follow the rational actor predictions. The United States now 
typically opts out of ICJ jurisdiction, as do several other major powers.125 
Most states, however, do not. They are willing to accept the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction and thus be “sitting ducks” to states that wish to game the 
system.126 It could be that other preferences motivate these states, such as 
the desire to bolster the ICJ as an instrument of the international rule of 
law or at least to signal their support for it. If so, however, then it is 
puzzling that most of these states do not also embrace the ICJ when 
confronted with opt-in clauses. There is a puzzle here — one that rational 
choice theory cannot easily explain.  
                                                          
123. See Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), Preliminary 
Objections, 1957 I.C.J. 125, at 141, 151 (November 26); Case Concerning Right of Passage over 
Indian Territory (Port. v. India), Merits, 1960 I.C.J. 6, at 33–34 (April 12). While most of the ICJ’s 
jurisprudence on this issue relates to Article 36(2), its approach would presumably extend to other 
opt-in clauses too, since the language of these opt-in clauses does not specify a different approach to 
timing. As another example (albeit one involving an optional protocol rather than an opt-in clause), 
Mexico ratified the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations less than a year before suing the United States for 
violations of the rights of Mexicans on death row that had, at least in some cases, taken place long in 
the past. See William J. Aceves, Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), 
Provisional Measures Order, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 923, 924 n.13 (2003). States sometimes craft their 
declarations under Article 36(2) so as to make it harder for other states to game the system against 
them. My review of declarations in relation to other opt-in or opt-out ICJ jurisdictional clauses, 
however, indicates that this practice is rare with regard to other treaties. 
124. Cf. Guzman, supra note 113, at 308 (suggesting that states enter into dispute-resolution 
clauses in order to have the ability to sue other states but that they do not desire to be sued).  
125. See supra Part II.A (identifying other frequent opt-outers, including China, India, and South 
Africa).  
126. See Stanimir A. Alexandrov, The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: How 
Compulsory Is It?, 5 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 29, 35 (2006) (observing that this has been described as a 
“sitting duck” or “hit-and-run” problem).  
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B. Choice Architecture 
Although rational choice theory cannot easily explain the results in Part 
II, these results line up extraordinarily well with a very different body of 
empirical research. This is the large and growing body of empirical work in 
behavioral economics and related fields on individual decision-making — 
research which reveals that individual decision-makers frequently deviate 
in predictable ways from rationally optimal behavior. Much of this work 
addresses what Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein call choice architecture: 
the study of how the ways in which options are presented affect individual 
decision-making.127 Here, I describe some findings regarding choice 
architecture and then explain how and why they might explain the 
responses of ratifying states to treaty options.  
1. The Literature on Individual Decision–Making 
Three of the findings generated by research on choice architecture are 
of particular interest for my purposes. These are the status quo bias, the 
salience bias, and peer effects, each of which is described briefly below. 
a. Status Quo Bias 
Empirical studies based both on real-life observations and on 
randomized experiments show that individuals tend to be biased in favor 
of whatever option is framed as the status quo. People are much more 
willing to be organ donors when they must opt out than when they must 
opt in.128 They use 401(k) programs at much higher rates when they are 
automatically enrolled with a withdrawal option than when they must 
affirmatively join.129 They tend to prefer the automobile insurance 
coverage level that is presented to them as the default.130 They are much 
more likely to agree to receive further solicitations from websites that 
allow opt-out than from similar websites that allow opt-in.131 In short, 
                                                          
127. See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 9, at 3. 
128. Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 4 at 1714–15. 
129. E.g., James Choi et al., For Better or For Worse: Default Effects and 401(k) Savings Behavior, in 
PERSPECTIVES IN THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 81, 83 (David Wise ed., 2003) (looking at several 
companies that changed from 401(k) opt-ins to opt-outs and finding that when opt-ins were used, 
only 26–43% of employees participated within their first six months, while when opt-outs were used 
over 85% of employees participated). 
130. Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, 7 J. OF RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 35, 48 (1993) (describing how New Jersey and Pennsylvania each offered automobile 
insurance whereby individuals could obtain a full right to sue by paying a higher premium, and 
finding that in New Jersey, where opt-in was required, only 20% did, so while in Pennsylvania, which 
used an opt-out, 75% did so).  
131. E.g., Eric J. Johnson et al., Defaults, Framing, and Privacy, 13 MARKETING LETTERS 5, 9 (2002) 
(finding in a randomized experiment that participants given the chance to opt-in to being contacted 
for further health surveys were willing to be so contacted at a much lower rate (48.2%) than were 
350 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 53:309 
people accept status quo options at rates well beyond what we would 
expect from rational actors.132 The reasons why this is true are debated. 
One proposed reason is that individuals perceive default options as 
reflecting an endorsement of this default (for example, individuals may 
believe that their 401(k) default reflects a recommendation from their 
employer).133 Another proposed reason is loss aversion. Individuals tend to 
weigh losses more than gains in decision-making, and so may weigh the 
risks of switching from a default option more heavily than the possible 
gains.134 Yet another proposed reason is procrastination: individuals 
continue to put off the decisions, perhaps naively expecting that they will 
make these decisions at a later time.135 
b. Salience Bias  
Empirical research also suggests that the salience with which 
information is presented affects the average extent to which individuals 
make use of it, in a way that goes beyond what we would expect from 
rational actors.136 When individuals fill out surveys about overdraft fees — 
thus bringing the issue to their minds — they are significantly less likely to 
incur such fees in the following months.137 The use of electronic toll 
                                                                                                                                      
those participants presented with an opt-out (of whom 96.3% remained willing to be contacted)); 
Yee-Lin Lai & Kai-Lung Hui, Internet Opt-In and Opt-Out: Investigating the Role of Frames, Defaults and 
Privacy Concerns, 2006 SIGMIS PROCEEDINGS 253 (finding in various randomized experiments on 
Internet privacy issues that defaults matter). 
132. E.g., William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. OF 
RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 7, 33–35 (1988) (finding that the default bias well exceeds the costs 
associated with switching choices in their experiments). 
133. E.g., John Beshears et al., The Importance of Default Options for Retirement Saving Outcomes: 
Evidence from the United States in SOCIAL SECURITY POLICY IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 167, 
184–87 (Jeffrey Brown et al. eds., 2009) (discussing this endorsement effect); Johnson et al., supra 
note 131, at 7. 
134. E.g., Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 132, at 35–36; see also Richard Thaler, Toward a 
Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. OF ECON. BEHAV. AND ORG. 39, 44 (1980) (coining the phrase 
endowment effect to describe this phenomenon). 
135. E.g., Beshears et al., supra note 133, at 184; Johnson et al., supra note 131, at 7. 
136. E.g., Shelley E. Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social Perception and Interaction, in JUDGMENT 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, 190, 192 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) 
(“Salience biases refer to the fact that colorful, dynamic, or other distinctive stimuli disproportionally 
engage attention and accordingly disproportionally affect judgments.”); George A. Akerlof, 
Procrastination and Obedience, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 2 (1991); see also, e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 131, 
at 39–40 (describing an experiment in which individuals asked how much insurance they would 
purchase for “acts of terrorism” or “disease” gave significantly higher answers than those asked how 
much insurance they would purchase for “any reason”). For a useful review of the literature, see 
Deborah Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing Taxes 11–16 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, NYU 
Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Working Paper No. 10–37, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1661322. 
137. Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman, Limited and Varying Consumer Attention: Evidence from 
Shocks to the Salience of Bank Overdraft Fees, (Fed. Res. Bank of Phila. Research Dep’t, Working Paper 
No. 11–17, 2011), available at http://www.phil.frb.org/research-and-data/publications/working-
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collection systems such as E-ZPass makes drivers less responsive to toll 
increases.138 Grocery shoppers are less likely to buy goods when the price 
displayed includes the sales tax, even when these shoppers are already well-
informed about the sales tax.139 In short, this research suggests that where 
information is presented more saliently (even if it is already known), it is 
likely to have a greater influence on individual decision-making. 
c. Peer Effects  
Individual decision-making can also be affected by information about 
how peers approach the same issue. Experiments on household energy 
consumption, for example, have shown that people change their behavior 
in response to information about their neighbors’ behavior. One such set 
of experiments by Ian Ayres, Sophie Raseman, and Alice Shih found that 
high-consuming households reduced their average energy consumption — 
and low-consuming households increased their average energy 
consumption — in response to information about their neighbors’ 
behavior.140 This is just one example of an extensive literature researching 
the influence of social norms on individual behavior. Broadly speaking, 
this literature indicates that individuals gain social and psychological 
benefits from conforming to the expectations or behavior of the group 
within which they are situated.141 These benefits can shape individual 
choices about how to behave, at least where individuals have information 
available about the choices made by other members of the group. 
d. Implications for Law 
This literature on individual decision-making is playing an increasingly 
important role in domestic legal scholarship and in the design of domestic 
structures. It offers instrumental insights into how preferred policy 
outcomes can best be achieved without depriving individuals of decision-
making authority. Indeed, scholars have suggested using choice 
architecture to “nudge” people towards desired practices in areas as 
diverse as tax, personal finances, plea bargaining, health, and antitrust.142 
                                                                                                                                      
papers/2011/wp11-17.pdf (emphasizing role of limited attention in individual decision-making).  
138. Amy Finkelstein, E-ZTax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates, 124 Q. J. ECON. 969 (2009). 
139. Raj Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145 (2009).  
140. Ian Ayres et al., Evidence from Two Large Field Experiments that Peer Comparison Feedback Can 
Reduce Residential Energy Usage (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15386, 2009), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15386.pdf; cf. Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, Energy 
Conservation “Nudges” and Environmentalist Ideology: Evidence from a Randomized Residential Electricity Field 
Experiment (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15939, 2010), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15939.pdf (finding that Democrats decreased but Republicans 
increased electricity consumption in response to information about their peers). 
141. Goodman and Jinks, supra note 7, at 640–41. 
142. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer 
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In international legal scholarship, however, we see far less use of this 
literature. To date, its most prominent use has occurred in constructivist 
accounts of human rights law, where Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks 
draw upon research on peer effects and social norms in proposing their 
acculturalization model of state behavior.143 In international relations, the 
influence of research in social psychology has a more substantial history, 
but one plagued with doubts about whether and how insights drawn from 
research on individual decision-making can translate to the broader world 
of international affairs.144 
2. Choice Architecture Applied to Treaty Options 
The findings described above in choice architecture research map 
impressively well onto the results set forth in Part II. Between them, the 
status quo bias, salience bias, and peer effects provide a powerful 
explanation both for why ratifying states might accept ICJ jurisdiction at 
much higher rates when presented with opt-out clauses than with opt-in 
clauses and for why these states might accept human rights compliance 
mechanisms at higher rates when presented with optional protocols rather 
than opt-in clauses. This subsection explains this connection and then 
considers why it might exist — in other words, why biases found in 
individual decision-making might also occur in the behavior of states. 
Consider first the showing that, on average, 80% of countries accept 
ICJ jurisdiction in treaties that allow them to opt out, while only 5% of 
countries embrace it in treaties that allow them to opt in. This result 
closely resembles the opt-in versus opt-out differences in individual 
behavior on organ donation, 401(k) plan enrollment, and so forth. Just as 
the individuals in these studies exhibit status-quo biases, so states seem to 
be exhibiting status-quo biases in the course of treaty ratification. They 
tend to embrace the default terms of the negotiated treaty and not take 
advantage of opt-ins or opt-outs in relation to ICJ jurisdiction. The fact 
that ICJ jurisdiction is a relatively minor aspect of most of these treaties 
                                                                                                                                      
Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1151–59 (2011); Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower Taxes, 99 GEO. L. J. 
1371 (2011); Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 IND. L.J. 1527 (2011); 
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 9. 
143. Goodman and Jinks, supra note 7; see also additional sources cited supra note 7. 
144. E.g., ROSE MCDERMOTT, RISK-TAKING IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: PROSPECT 
THEORY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1998); J. M. Goldgeier & P. E. Tetlock, Psychology and 
International Relations Theory, 4 ANNU. REV. POLIT. SCI. 67 (2001). For doubts, see, e.g., GOLDSMITH 
& POSNER, supra note 2, at 8 (observing that “individual cognitive errors might have few if any macro 
effects on international relations”); cf. Jack S. Levy, Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International 
Relations, 41 INT’L STUD. Q. 87 (1997) (noting both the possible gains and pitfalls of applying 
psychological research on individual risk-taking to international relations). Some scholars working 
broadly within a rational choice framework do build in principles such as risk aversion into their 
models. See, e.g., RATIONAL DESIGN, supra note 2, at 22.  
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doubtless strengthens the effect of the status quo bias. It is unlikely to be a 
coincidence that the treaty which assigns the most important role to ICJ 
jurisdiction and which serves the greatest signaling role — the Statute of 
the ICJ — is also the treaty where state participation least tracks the status 
quo. 
In addition, the salience bias might help explain why average state 
participation in ICJ jurisdictional clauses is higher in treaties that simply 
permit reservations (95%) than in treaties that explicitly note states’ rights 
to opt out (80%). An opt-out clause serves as an explicit reminder to states 
that they can opt out. State ratifiers do not have to go through the hoops 
of first remembering the background rules of treaty reservations and then 
further identifying the ICJ jurisdictional clause as one that might merit a 
reservation. Opt-out clauses are thus more salient than are the ordinary 
rights of reservation, and the salience bias may help explain the observable 
differences in state participation. I offer this possibility with a grain of salt, 
however, since, for the reasons discussed in Part II, I also think it possible 
that the observable differences here are entirely due to other factors. 
The salience bias also provides a plausible explanation for why states 
might be more likely to ratify optional protocols than to opt in to 
equivalent clauses in the main text of the treaty. Optional protocols are 
much more salient than opt-in clauses. Whereas opt-in clauses are buried 
discretely in the main text of treaties, optional protocols are separate 
treaties with their own names. Ratifying states may thus be subject to a 
salience bias that causes them to be more aware of optional protocols — 
and perhaps also more willing to view their content as important — than 
opt-in clauses. In addition, because a salience bias might cause more 
attention to be paid to an optional protocol ratification than to a 
substantively equivalent opt-in option under an opt-in clause, states might 
realize greater reputational gains from the optional protocol ratification 
and thus be more inclined towards it. Peer effects might further accentuate 
the effects of a salience bias: if countries observe that other countries are 
ratifying an optional protocol then they may be more likely to do so as 
well.  
Peer effects might also contribute to the difference in state participation 
between ICJ opt-in clauses and ICJ opt-out clauses. Information on 
whether states opt in or opt out of these clauses is a matter of public 
record and easy to obtain (unlike information on whether one’s neighbors 
are organ donors or have 401(k) plans). If states that ratify the treaty early 
on tend to follow the status quo, then that may make states that ratify the 
treaty later even more likely to do the same. In effect, there would be a 
positive feedback loop: the fewer states opt out, the less likely other states 
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are to do so; and, similarly, the fewer states that opt in, the less likely other 
states are to do so.145  
Choice architecture principles thus provide a powerful explanation for 
why the way in which treaty options are framed might affect the responses 
of ratifying states. For this explanation to be believable, however, there 
must be good reasons for thinking that state decision-making might reflect 
the same kind of biases found in individual decision-making. As José 
Alvarez has observed, models that project cognitive biases onto states run 
the risk of “pop psychology without people,” leaving the mechanisms that 
make them applicable “as opaque as the black billiard balls that realists call 
‘states.’”146 Fittingly, the answer to why states might reflect these cognitive 
biases turns on the fact that state ratification decisions are made by people, 
and that these people are in turn usually answerable to other people. 
Accordingly, there are multiple plausible pathways by which state decision-
making could reflect cognitive biases.  
The first and most obvious pathway is that the decision-makers within 
the ratifying states could have cognitive biases.147 State processes for treaty 
ratification vary, but most will involve a decision by executive actors (such 
as foreign service officers or heads of state) to submit a treaty to the 
legislature, approval by the legislature, and transmission of the ratification, 
plus any accompanying declarations or reservations, to the treaty 
depository. Unless the legislature occupies itself closely with the micro-
details of the treaty, the main decision-making about treaty options is likely 
to lie with the executive actors. These actors may have an instinctive bias 
towards whatever status quo is written into the treaty, for reasons similar 
to individual status quo biases. These actors may consider the default 
options to have the endorsement of the negotiating conference, or simply, 
to be loss averse and therefore the actors may be reluctant to change the 
status quo.148 They might similarly be subject to salience biases or 
                                                          
145. Cf. Helfer, supra note 42, at 369–70 (noting that states that are later to ratify have more 
information available about the actions of prior states and suggesting that this might lead to a first-
mover disadvantage).  
146. José E. Alvarez, Do States Socialize?, 54 DUKE L.J. 961, 969 (2005). For another good 
discussion of the aggregation problem, see Levy, supra note 144, at 102–04.  
147. There is a developing literature on how group decision-making can reflect individual 
cognitive biases, as well as other biases introduced through the organizational process. E.g., Colin F. 
Camerer & Ulrike Malmendier, Behavioral Economics of Organizations, in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
AND ITS APPLICATIONS 235 (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007); Samuelson & 
Zeckhauser, supra note 132, at 45–46. For a study on how cognitive biases by state decision-makers 
can affect policy decisions in the context of policy diffusion across borders, see Kurt Weyland, 
Theories of Policy Diffusion: Lessons from Latin American Pension Reform, 57 World Pol. 262, 269, 281–94 
(2005). 
148. Procrastination is another possible reason why state actors might have a status quo bias, but 
it seems less likely than in the organ donation or 401(k) context for two reasons. First, state actors 
have stronger incentives to not procrastinate because the political effort required to revisit an ICJ 
jurisdictional clause after ratification will probably be significantly greater than the political effort 
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influenced by peer effects, particularly if they view themselves as situated 
within a community of nations.  
Second, even if state decision-makers have no cognitive biases, their 
decision-making may nonetheless be affected by the real or perceived 
cognitive biases of other actors. For example, a head of state might 
embrace the default option written into a treaty if she projects loss 
aversion onto her domestic audience and thus thinks she faces greater 
political risks from making an active decision rather than a passive one. As 
another example, a salience bias on the part of human rights groups or 
international organizations seeking to persuade states to join compliance 
mechanisms might cause them to push harder in relation to compliance 
mechanisms set forth in optional protocols than to those set forth in opt-
in clauses. This in turn would incentivize state actors to prioritize optional 
protocols more than opt-in clauses. 
In suggesting that state decision-making may reflect cognitive biases 
similar to those found in individual decision-making, I do not mean to 
suggest that these biases will appear equally across states. Not only do 
states have heterogeneity in their interests, but they also likely have 
different levels of susceptibility to various cognitive biases. The United 
States, for example, is quite consistent in its approach to ICJ jurisdictional 
clauses and human rights compliance mechanisms, regardless of how these 
are framed. There may be institutional features that predict the extent to 
which states respond to various cognitive biases. A state that has each 
treaty reviewed internally by numerous lawyers may be institutionally less 
susceptible to the salience bias than a state where treaty review is 
conducted primarily by one overworked official. A state whose ratifying 
actors have been heavily involved in a treaty’s negotiations may be less 
influenced by a status quo bias in relation to an opt-in or opt-out clause 
than a less-involved state because of its comparative familiarity with the 
negotiating context. A large state may be less responsive to peer effects 
than a small state. In short, the effects of choice architecture may vary 
predictably across states.  
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
The previous Parts have argued that we can better understand how 
ratifying states approach treaty options if, instead of simply using rational 
choice theory, we instead project at least some of the biases common in 
individual decision-making onto state behavior. Here, I consider some 
implications of this argument. I begin narrowly by considering how choice 
                                                                                                                                      
required to opt in at the time the treaty is ratified. Second, procrastination is usually not an option 
with regard to ICJ opt-out clauses, as parties typically can only exercise their right to opt out at the 
time they join the treaties. 
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architecture principles can aid negotiators going forward. I then turn to 
some of the broader implications that flow from understanding states as 
subject to some of the same cognitive biases found in individuals. I suggest 
several other ways in which choice architecture might improve 
international regime design.149 
The broader implications presented here come with an important 
caveat. While reasoning from choice architecture principles may offer 
gains in both predictive power and usefulness to policy-makers as 
compared with a rational choice model, these improvements will depend 
on understanding what biases states are subject to and under what 
situations. Unfortunately, there is no single overarching answer to this 
question, as compared with the simplicity and elegance of a rational choice 
model. Even in the individual decision-making context, this answer is 
context dependent.150 In the state context, the additional difficulties 
associated with projecting individual cognitive biases onto state behavior 
make it even more difficult to determine what biases to look for when. 
While I can offer thoughts about how this approach operates in the 
specific context that I am studying — treaty options — with a reasonably 
high degree of confidence, I can only hypothesize about how choice 
architecture principles may apply to other aspects of international regime 
design. Even without more research, however, international legal actors 
might well wish to incorporate insights from choice architecture into their 
decision-making, at least with regard to framing. If framing does not 
matter, then no harm is done; and if it does in fact matter, then its 
instrumental use can benefit these actors. 
A. Treaty Options 
Treaty negotiators should take insights from choice architecture into 
account in choosing among treaty options. Negotiators should select treaty 
options with an awareness of how phenomena like the status quo bias, the 
salience bias, and peer effects may affect the behavior of ratifying states. 
Some negotiators doubtless have some intuitive grasp of these factors. At 
the Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
                                                          
149. My argument presumes a system that relies on state consent, whether explicit or implicit. I 
do not consider broader questions of whether international law should move away from its current 
acceptance of the need for some form of state consent in most circumstances. But see generally Andrew 
T. Guzman, Against Consent, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 747, 775–78 (2012) (arguing that international law 
should rely less on state consent overall). 
150. E.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the 
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1057–58 (2000) (observing that, 
“This movement . . . lacks a single, coherent theory of behavior,” but that “one can analyze the 
appropriate legal command in any given circumstance without a grand, overarching theory of 
behavior so long as one has a due regard for the relevant decision-making capacities of the actors in 
that specific setting.”). 
2013] TREATY OPTIONS  357 
Court, for example, negotiators closely considered the choice of treaty 
option that would give rise to the court’s jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression.151 However, there can be astonishing heedlessness even among 
experts. Negotiators may think choosing between an opt-in and an opt-out 
is “merely [a matter] of formulating a rule one way or the other,” as one 
expert once remarked,152 and not appreciate the role that framing can play 
in affecting state decisions. 
Most directly, the results from this Article indicate that negotiators 
interested in more robust treaties should avoid opt-in clauses whenever 
possible. Instead, where they think participation in a certain part of the 
treaty must be made optional in order to ensure participation in the treaty 
more broadly, they should make use of opt-out clauses or simply leave it to 
states to reserve out of controversial clauses. If neither of these 
alternatives is achievable, the negotiators should still steer clear of opt-in 
clauses set in the main text and instead favor optional protocols. This 
approach would harness the status quo and salience biases in favor of 
more robust treaty obligations. Of course, these biases are likely to have 
greatest effect where underlying state preferences are weak. Even on issues 
on which most states have strong preferences, however, framing might 
influence the decision-making of at least some states. 
Choice architecture also offers insights for treaty negotiators as they 
choose timing rules to incorporate into opt-in or opt-out clauses. 
Negotiators can word a clause to permit opt-in or opt-out at any time or 
instead only at the time a state joins a treaty. The apparent trade-off here is 
between immediate participation and long-term participation: allowing 
states to opt in at any time may favor long-term participation but deter 
immediate participation relative to opt-in decisions that must be made at 
the time of joining; and conversely allowing states to opt out at any time 
may favor immediate participation over long-term participation relative to 
                                                          
151. See Claus Kreß & Leonie von Holtzendorff, The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression, 
8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1179, 1194–99, 1212–16 (2010) (discussing the complex negotiations and their 
resolution). 
152. United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, 2nd Sess., Vienna Apr. 9–May 22, 1969, 
Official Records, 34, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11/Add.1 (1970) (remarks of Sir. Humphrey Waldock, 
who had been the Special Rapporteur for the International Law Commission on the Law of Treaties 
and was present as an expert consultant). This remark arose during the drafting of the Vienna 
Convention during a debate about how to frame the consequences of a state’s objection to another 
state’s reservation: should this objection preclude the treaty from entering into force between these 
states unless the objecting state specified otherwise, or instead should this objection preclude the 
treaty from entering into force between these states only if the objecting state explicitly stated that it 
desired this result? Sir Humphrey Waldock further observed that “from the point of view of 
substance it was doubtful if there was any great consideration in favour of stating the rule in one way 
rather than the other, provided it was perfectly clear.” Id. But see Special Rapporteur, The Law and 
Practice Relating to Reservations to Treaties, Int’l Law Comm’n, 28 & 28 n.133, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/470 
(May 30, 1995) (by Alain Pellet) (citing Sir Humphrey Waldock’s comments and observing that “the 
reversal of the presumption may, however, seem less innocuous.”).  
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opt-out decisions that must be made at the time of joining. But choice 
architecture suggests that treaty negotiators should take into account the 
possibility that, given the chance, states will procrastinate in making 
affirmative decisions about opt-ins or opt-outs at levels that go beyond 
what we would expect from rational actors. Where opt-in clauses are used, 
then, both immediate and long-term participation rates could conceivably 
be strengthened by only allowing states to opt in at the time they joined 
the treaties (although such restrictions on timing might be difficult to make 
credibly).153 Conversely, where states are allowed to opt out of treaty 
provisions or make reservations “at any time” rather than simply when 
they join the treaty, they may not only participate in these provisions at 
higher rates initially but also delay opting out or reserving in the future in 
ways that result in higher long-term participation rates as well.154 To be 
clear, I am not saying that strict timing rules with opt-in clauses and 
relaxed ones with opt-out or reservations clauses are always better, but 
only that choice architecture suggests that such rules might have more 
advantages than we would otherwise anticipate. 
Choice architecture also provides insights for negotiators to consider in 
choosing among negotiated options, the default rules on treaty 
reservations, and no-reservations clauses. Most intriguingly, some choice 
architecture principles suggest that treaty negotiators might consider 
trusting more to the default rules on treaty reservations than they do in 
practice. The default rules give rise to the concern that ratifying states will 
opportunistically attach reservations even if these reservations are not 
material to their decisions to join the treaties.155 One partial solution used 
in many treaties — including 60 treaties in my dataset — is to include a 
no-reservation clause accompanied by specific opt-out provisions. This 
approach is attractive because it gives ratifying states flexibility on 
collectively recognized issues of disagreement but cabins their ability to 
make reservations of their own choosing. In considering this approach, 
however, negotiators should consider that the risk that states will attach 
opportunistic reservations is likely reduced in the first place by the status 
quo bias, especially with regard to less important matters.156 In addition, 
                                                          
153. Cf. Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061, 2074 (2003) (discussing the 
possibility of setting time restrictions on treaty ratification but acknowledging that it would be hard 
to make such limits credible).  
154. This might be especially true to the extent that there is social pressure from other states 
against exercising a right of subsequent opt-out. Such social pressure can be found, for example, 
where states exercise their right to withdraw from a treaty under a termination clause and then rejoin 
with reservations. See Helfer, supra note 42, at 371–75 (discussing various examples but noting that 
states have reputational incentives not to engage in such behavior). 
155. See Parisi & Fon, supra note 11, at 209. 
156. Cf. id. (“The study of reservations in multilateral treaties reveals a striking paradox: the 
number of reservations attached to international treaties is relatively low despite the rules governing 
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these negotiators should also keep in mind that by saliently identifying 
issues where opt-out is permissible, they may inspire states to opt out at 
higher rates than they would do if the default rule on treaty reservations 
were instead applicable. The default rules on treaty reservations thus may 
have more merit than commentators often suggest. Nonetheless, to the 
extent that negotiators are concerned about the behavior of states that 
seem structurally more immune to cognitive biases, such as the United 
States, these negotiators might be wary of trusting to the default rules on 
treaty reservations. 
Finally, to the extent that negotiators wish to discourage ratifying states 
from making reservations or taking advantage of opt-out clauses without 
fully banning these states’ rights to do so, then the negotiators could draw 
on choice architecture principles to set up further nudges in favor of full 
participation in the treaty. For example, negotiators could include a clause 
that requires states to renew opt-outs or reservations after every few years, 
thus changing the status quo from presumptive continuation of an opt-out 
or reservation to presumptive termination. Negotiators could also seek to 
strengthen peer influence against reservations by requiring states to present 
their reservations every few years to the conference of the parties, if one is 
established by the treaty.  
B. Broader Applications 
Beyond treaty options, choice architecture principles offer powerful 
insights into the design of international regimes more generally. By 
drawing on choice architecture, regime designers can potentially increase 
state participation, bolster the power of international institutions, and 
improve compliance with international law. As noted earlier, the 
significance of choice architecture may vary depending on the 
circumstances, but prudent regime designers would do well to factor in its 
possible influences. Here, I outline five possible ways in which choice 
architecture principles might affect regime design. 
First, treaty negotiators may be subject to cognitive biases. Although I 
have focused this Article on the possible biases of treaty ratifiers, 
negotiators may also be influenced by status quo biases, salience biases, 
peer effects, and other cognitive biases. For example, a status quo bias 
might make them exceptionally inclined to borrow from the templates 
used in previous treaties in the same subject matter.157 As Jose Alvarez has 
                                                                                                                                      
reservations set forth in the Vienna Convention that create a natural advantage in favor of the 
reserving state.”) Parisi & Fon attempt to explain this “paradox” using rational choice theory, but a 
status quo bias can also explain much of it. 
157. This prediction is consistent with negotiating choices on treaty options. While negotiators 
frequently contract around the default rules on treaty reservations, as I showed in Part I.C., their 
choices in this regard often look quite a lot like cut-and-paste copies of prior treaties in the same 
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observed, “[o]nce a particular model has been successfully negotiated in a 
given field, negotiators in that field will tend to follow it simply because it 
is familiar or has been shown to work.”158 Treaty negotiators should take 
this status quo bias into account. In negotiating initial treaties in a field, for 
example — even temporary or ad hoc treaties — they should be aware 
that their choices will likely have an exceptional influence over the shape 
of treaties to come. Similarly, negotiators of later treaties should be aware 
that they may be overly biased in favor of the status quo and consider 
taking steps to counteract this bias.  
Second, choice architecture principles may provide support for 
structuring international agreements as pledges rather than contracts. As 
Kal Raustiala has observed, at the highest level of generality, international 
actors must choose between pledges and contracts, each of which can be 
done in a variety of ways.159 He notes that because pledges are not legally 
binding, states may be more willing to commit to significant substantive 
changes through them rather than through contracts.160 If states are 
subject to similar cognitive biases as individual decision-makers, then this 
would strengthen his argument even more. For example, risk aversion and 
loss aversion may lead states to have exaggerated concerns about 
substantively deep contracts and thus increase the relative attractiveness of 
pledges. Once a pledge is made, however, the status quo bias and peer 
effects may make states less likely to abandon their pledges than they 
anticipate at the time they make these pledges.  
Third, choice architecture may offer insights for how specifically 
negotiators should frame treaty commitments, especially in relation to 
compliance. Some behavioral economics research shows that, under 
certain conditions, parties undertake higher levels of performance towards 
each other — or at least are less inclined to breach — where contracts rely 
implicitly on background social norms than where they spell out 
obligations and consequences of breach at high levels of specificity.161 The 
                                                                                                                                      
subject matter. For example, environmental treaties typically have virtually identical opt-in 
jurisdictional clauses (despite their tiny take-up rates) and no-reservation clauses, and penal matters 
clauses typically use virtually identical opt-out jurisdictional clauses. See supra note 72. The final 
clauses used in one treaty thus seem to become the drafting template for the final clauses used in the 
next related treaty — and this likely explains in part why negotiators continue to prove willing to 
contract around the Vienna Convention’s default rules.  
158. See JOSE ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 317 (2005). 
159. See Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 581, 582 
(2005). 
160. Id. at 582–83.  
161. E.g., George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange, 97 Q. J. ECON. 543, 549 
(1982) (arguing that certain interactions within the labor market derive from a model of mutual gift 
exchange rather than contract); Uri Gneezy& Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 
15 (2000) (showing that parents were more likely to pick up their children late from day care where 
modest fines were imposed than when no fines at all were imposed); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do 
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theory is that more specific, market-oriented terms “crowd out” the 
background social norms.162 It would be valuable to know whether this 
phenomenon applies in relation to treaties, which often include weak 
provisions for enforcement. If crowding out applies to state behavior, then 
such provisions might sometimes make states more inclined towards 
breach than they would be in the absence of any enforcement provisions 
at all.163 
Fourth, choice architecture principles might also support making 
treaties easy to exit from on paper. States have many reasons to value the 
right of exit from a treaty highly.164 To the extent that they are risk averse, 
however, they may value this right even more highly going into a treaty 
than one would otherwise expect — and thus, as with pledges, be willing 
to accept notably deeper substantive commitments in return. Once in the 
treaty, however, the status quo bias and peer effects may make them 
unwilling to exercise their right of exit in ways that go beyond 
straightforward concerns about the substantive or reputational costs of 
exit. 
Finally, choice architecture may offer useful insights for international 
actors who are implementing treaty regimes. Consider, for example, the 
Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR, which has great trouble getting 
states to comply with the reporting obligations that the ICCPR imposes on 
these states.165 The Committee has taken the approach of threatening to 
issue its own reports with regard to truly delinquent states — and then 
issuing these reports if the states remain unresponsive.166 Instead of this 
approach, or as a complement to it, the Committee could increasingly 
experiment with tactics like those shown to work in the context of 
household electricity consumption — that is, notifying offending states 
that neighboring states are in compliance with the reporting requirements. 
                                                                                                                                      
Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633 (2010) (showing 
that participants in an experiment were more willing to breach a contract where liquidated damages 
were specified).  
162. DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL 68 (2008). 
163. Cf. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 7, at 675–700 (suggesting that under their acculturalization 
model of state behavior, precision in treaty obligations and sanctions can sometimes be 
counterproductive). 
164. See generally Laurence Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579 (2005); Barbara 
Koremenos, Contracting around International Uncertainty, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 549 (2005); Barbara 
Koremenos & Allison Nau, Exit, No Exit, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 81 (2010). 
165. See Rep. of the Human Rights Comm., 97th Sess., 98th Sess., 99th Sess., Oct. 12–30 2009, 
Mar. 8–26, 2010, July 12–30, 2010, 11–17, U.N. Doc. A/65/40 (Vol. I); GAOR, 65th Sess., Supp. 
No. 40 (2010) (listing 54 states that are over five years overdue with their reporting obligations). 
166. See id. at 13–17 (noting the adoption of this approach and its application in specific 
contexts). Where the Committee threatens to issue its own report, states sometimes but not always 
head it off by submitting their own reports. See id. (discussing how Surinam, Kenya, Barbados, 
Nicaragua, and San Marino submitted reports to forestall the Committee, but Gambia, Equatorial 
Guinea, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Grenada did not).  
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It may be, of course, that such nudges will not translate to the international 
context. If they do not, however, then little harm will be done by trying 
them — and if they do, then the gains may be valuable indeed.  
V. CONCLUSION 
When the Statute of the International Court of Justice was drafted, 
treaty negotiators wavered between two main proposals regarding the ICJ’s 
jurisdiction. The first would have given the ICJ jurisdiction over all 
international legal disputes between states.167 The second — the one that 
ultimately became Article 36(2) — allowed states to opt in to such 
jurisdiction.168 Today, only about 34% of United Nations member states 
have done so.  
The findings in this Article suggest these treaty negotiators (and many 
others) missed an easy opportunity to bolster state acceptance of ICJ 
jurisdiction. Although they barely considered the possibility of an opt-out 
clause,169 its use likely would have resulted in greater acceptance of ICJ 
jurisdiction. Such a clause would also likely have been acceptable to treaty 
negotiators wary of straight-up compulsory jurisdiction, as it would have 
left states with the right to opt out of such jurisdiction. We can only 
imagine what the ICJ’s increased role would look like under such a 
circumstance; and what its bolstered authority and significance might mean 
for the rule of international law. 
The specific argument of this Article is that the way in which a treaty 
option is framed can affect the likelihood that states will accept it. There is 
low-hanging fruit out there for treaty negotiators interested in increasing 
state participation without sacrificing strength. More broadly, and even 
more importantly, this Article reveals an urgent need for future research 
into the implications that choice architecture holds for international regime 
design. If states are responsive to framing effects and other cognitive 
biases, as the findings of this Article suggest, then design choices that take 
                                                          
167. See Report of the Rapporteur of Committee IV/1, (June 12, 1945) in 13 Doc. U.N. Conf. on Int’l 
Org. 557, 390–392 (1945).  
168. See id. This approach followed that taken in the Statue of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice. See generally Lorna Lloyd, A Springboard for the Future: A Historical Examination of 
Britain’s Role in Shaping the Optional Clause of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 79 AM. J. INT’L 
LAW 28 (1985) (detailing the drafting history of the PCIJ’s optional clause). 
169. At a preliminary conference, the Egyptian delegation briefly floated the possibility of making 
jurisdiction compulsory but allowing “each State to escape it by a reservation.” U.N. Comm. of 
Jurists, supra note 73. For the most part, though, debate over striking a compromise between an opt-
in clause and obligatory jurisdiction focused on a proposal made by New Zealand of allowing 
reservations to the scope of the ICJ’s jurisdiction but not to the overall fact of its jurisdiction. See  Report 
of Subcommittee D to Committee IV/1 on Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, (May 31, 
1945) in 13 Doc. U.N. Conf. on Int’l Org. 557, 557–561 (1945) (discussing  the attached New Zealand 
proposal specifically and the jurisdiction generally). 
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these effects into account could considerably enhance the effectiveness of 
international regimes.  
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